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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the thesis is to reveal the role of multilateral cooperation in 
fighting against transnational terrorism and to identify the place of the Shanghai 
Cooperation organization in the multilateral cooperation in fighting against 
transnational terrorism. The object of the study is the multilateral cooperation in 
fighting against transnational terrorism. The subject of the study is the role of 
multilateral cooperation in fighting against transnational terrorism; the place of the 
Shanghai Cooperation organization in this cooperation.In his work the author: 
- revealed the characteristics of modern transnational terrorism in accordance 
with the criterion of the significance of these features for multilateral anti-terrorist 
struggle; 
- traced the development of multilateral interstate cooperation in the fight 
against transnational terrorism; 
- reviewed the existing mechanisms to counter this threat within specific 
multilateral organizations, analyzed their functioning, assessed the compliance of the 
measures taken with the nature of the transnational terrorist threat and identified 
some problems in their activities; 
- analyzed the SCO strategy in the fight against terrorism, extremism and 
separatism, defined the place and role of the SCO in the multilateral struggle against 
transnational terrorism and showed the prospects for increasing the effectiveness of 
this organization in this direction. 
As a result of the analysis of the activities of multilateral institutions such as 
the UN, NATO and the SCO, it was possible to establish that the lack of a single and 
complete understanding of the specific nature of the threat of transnational terrorism 
is today the main barrier to effective interstate cooperation at all levels. 
Unfortunately, none of the analyzed multilateral associations has yet come to the 
realization that transnational terrorism poses a threat to the modern state-centered 
political system of the world, that is, ultimately, a threat to the existence of the 
national states that form these multilateral organizations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The relevance of the topic.After the end of the cold war, the world community 
faced new challenges and security threats that were previously considered secondary, 
among which "transnational terrorism" occupies a special place, which can lead to 
destabilization of the international situation in the 21st century.The events of 
September 11, 2001 in the United States, which became the most large-scale terrorist 
acts in the history of mankind, clearly demonstrated the unpreparedness of the world 
community to repel the threat of new transnational terrorism, which is fighting in 
many countries of the world and setting global goals. 
The terrorist method, as an instrument of political struggle, has been used since 
ancient times. The internationalization of terrorist activities is also not an innovation, 
as terrorism has previously moved beyond national borders. Modern transnational 
terrorism poses a threat to the Westphalian system of national states, which has been 
the basis of interstate cooperation for more than 350 years. It is the threat of the 
destruction of the modern political system of the world that speaks about the 
possibility and necessity of the joint struggle of different states with transnational 
terrorism, which in the 21st century really became one of the global problems of 
world political development. 
Thus, the world community has to solve several rather complex and 
interrelated tasks. First, it is necessary to fight the terrorist method itself, which is 
today the main object of multilateral and domestic efforts. This also includes the 
search for and prosecution of members of transnational terrorist organizations 
involved in the implementation or planning of terrorist acts. Secondly, in addition to 
combating the terrorist method, it is necessary to try to resolve the underlying 
political problems underlying transnational terrorism, connected with the existing 
contradictions of the current stage of world political development, so that the 
terrorists' alternative to the political system of the world will lose its attractiveness. 
This, in turn, will reduce the influx of new recruits for terrorist organizations and 
sharply reduce the number of sympathizers, as the latter will have the opportunity to 
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voice their concerns and put forward proposals through institutionalized channels of 
communication. Thus, we are talking about finding an acceptable option for the 
participation of all cultures and civilizations, including Islamic, in the process of 
global development. 
The problem of transnational terrorism is firmly entrenched, as one of the 
central themes of the security agenda of the world's largest states and international 
organizations, which is evidence of the importance of counteracting this phenomenon 
at the present stage. 
International organizations do not stand aside from the antiterrorist problem. 
Among them, one can highlight the work of the only universal organization in the 
world - the United Nations. The General Assembly adopted the first in the history of 
the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which formulated the general 
provisions of the anti-terrorist struggle for the member countries of this organization. 
In the list of priority areas of activity of many regional organizations, the 
problem of terrorism also occupies the top lines. In particular, at the NATO summit 
held in Riga in late November 2006, the Final Statement of the Heads of State or 
Government attending the meeting of the North Atlantic Council states: "We strongly 
condemn terrorism, no matter what it motivates, in any form, and we will fight with it 
together until it is necessary, in accordance with international law and the principles 
of the United Nations." 
The European Union, as the leading multidirectional integration association in 
the European space, also perceives the problem of transnational terrorism as a serious 
threat to its member countries, which became especially evident after the terrorist 
attacks on 11 March 2004 in Madrid. On 4-5 May 2006 in Vienna, the International 
Conference on International Security, organized by the Presidency of the European 
Union, Austria, adopted the Vienna Declaration on Partnership for Security, Part 2 of 
which, "On Combating Terrorism" states: "The recent terrorist atrocities only 
underscore the fact that it is no longer possible to distinguish between external and 
internal security, and terrorism itself is increasingly transnational in nature. As a 
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result, international cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism must become an 
important element of external relations." 
Multilateral efforts to combat transnational terrorism are being made in other 
regions of the world, in particular, in the Eurasian space, where the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, established in 2001, has already established itself as one 
of the leading players. 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an international organization 
founded in 2001 by the leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Uzbekistan.The SCO is a multilateral association whose activities are aimed at 
ensuring security and maintaining stability in the vast Euro-Asian area, jointly 
opposing new challenges and threats, strengthening trade, economic and cultural-
humanitarian cooperation. 
The historic SCO summit in Astana on June 8-9, 2017 opened a new stage in 
the development of the Organization. One of its most important results was the 
granting of India and Pakistan the status of full members of the association. The entry 
into the SCO of two powerful and authoritative states of South Asia has expanded the 
potential and range of the Organization's work opportunities, including in the field of 
joint counteraction to traditional and new challenges and threats. 
The vast area of the SCO, with a total population of almost 44% of the world 
population, poses the principal task of collective ensuring stability, effective 
counteraction to joint threats and security challenges along the whole contour of the 
zone of responsibility of the largest regional organization in the world today.Uniting 
the four nuclear powers - half of the world nuclear club - the format of the SCO is an 
additional pillar of the system of maintaining world strategic stability. 
Terrorism poses a serious threat to the security and stability of Central Asia, 
China, Russia, India, and Pakistan. Therefore, the SCO countries, considering their 
main task to combat this threat, express their common position and coordinate their 
efforts to combat them. 
All of the above illustrates the importance attached to the problem of 
combating transnational terrorism, both at the national and international levels. 
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Terrorists of the XXI century, possessing a high degree of mobility, can strike their 
blow anywhere in the world and today virtually no country in the world can be 
immune from terrorist acts, just as no state can cope with this problem alone. The 
challenge facing the international community is extremely complex: it must try to 
prevent future terrorist attacks by improving the exchange of information and 
preventing terrorists from obtaining the means to fulfill them, and at the same time 
preventing the already prepared terrorist acts. Given the nature of transnational 
terrorism, none of these tasks can be resolved without intensive international 
cooperation, since many terrorist acts are planned in one country, implemented in 
another, and the perpetrators themselves are citizens of third countries. 
The current understanding of the need for joint action to overcome the 
transnational terrorist threat is indeed a significant achievement. For example, during 
the Cold War, when the two superpowers actually controlled global political 
processes and sometimes provided explicit or implicit support to terrorist groups and 
movements, effective multilateral cooperation in the fight against terrorism at the 
international level was difficult. The disintegration of the bipolar system gave new 
impetus to the development of international cooperation in new areas, including, in 
the antiterrorist sphere. For example, in the 1990s the UN adopted a number of new 
antiterrorist conventions. In addition, joint efforts have succeeded in sharply limiting 
the phenomenon of international terrorism with state support, which was developed 
in the 1980s. 
However, in the same 1990's, national states did not attach much importance to 
the emergence of a new type of terrorism - transnational. It is the terrorist threat from 
well-organized transnational clandestine groups that is currently one of the main 
problems of global security. Terrorists of the 21st century, who have strong religious 
motivation as an ideological basis, are trying to inflict as much damage as possible. 
To achieve this, they can even try to obtain nuclear, radiological, chemical or 
biological weapons. 
In addition, transnational terrorism quite clearly demonstrated the imperfection 
of modern international security structures aimed at containing and repelling the 
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threat posed by national states. For a long time, terrorism was considered only as a 
problem of the internal security of each individual country, i.e. was, mainly, the 
object of attention of the internal security organs. Modern transnational terrorism 
clearly showed the limitations of this approach. Thus, today the issue on building up 
existing institutions for ensuring international security, and also, perhaps, creating 
new ones, whose aim will be not only a repulse of possible aggression on the part of 
states, but also protection from the external threat emanating from such non-state 
actor, as transnational terrorism. In this regard, it is necessary for states to establish 
cooperation in a new area for them. 
The purpose of the thesis is to revealthe role of multilateral cooperation in 
fighting against transnational terrorism and to identify the place of the Shanghai 
Cooperation organization in the multilateral cooperation in fighting against 
transnational terrorism.  
The tasks of the thesis. For achieving the goals, which set in the work, it was 
necessary to solve the following tasks: 
- To identify the main features and definition of transnational terrorism; 
- To reveal the causes of terrorist activity at the turn of the 20th and 21st 
centuries; 
- To identify the characteristics of the development of transnational terrorism in 
modern conditions and the necessity for joint struggle against it; 
- To show the role of the UN in the fight against terrorism as a universal 
intergovernmental organization; 
- To analyze the anti-terrorist activities of NATO, as a regional military-political 
association; 
- To explore the main directions of activity of International Anti-Terrorist 
Coalition as an example of anti-terrorism activities outside the framework of 
intergovernmental organizations; 
- To analyze the formation of the SCO as a full-fledged regional organization 
and to study the main areas of cooperation within the SCO; 
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- To reveal the essence the SCO strategy in the fight against terrorism, 
extremism and separatism; 
- To analyze the place of the SCO in the multilateral cooperation in fighting 
against transnational terrorism. 
The object of the studyis the multilateral cooperation in fighting against 
transnational terrorism. 
The subject of the studyis the role of multilateral cooperation in fighting against 
transnational terrorism; the place of the Shanghai Cooperation organization in this 
cooperation. 
Analysis of the literature.In foreign scientific literature, the problem of 
international cooperation in combating the terrorist threat has long remained outside 
the field of view of researchers. In particular, until 1995, in one of the leading 
American journals on terrorism, "Terrorism and Political Violence", there was not a 
single article on the role of the United Nations in the fight against terrorism or 
international anti-terrorism cooperation in general. As Jan Lesser, an analyst at 
RAND Corporation, points out, "Most modern studies view terrorist political 
violence as an independent phenomenon, outside its geopolitical or strategic 
contexts." Lesser advocates a "central" strategy and a "multidimensional" approach, 
which will include not only direct responses to manifestations of terrorism, but also 
the formation of an international environment for rejecting this phenomenon. 
The source database of the study is made up of official UN, NATO, EU and 
SCO documents, the study of which contributed to a better understanding of the 
essence of the problem, the positions of states and international organizations on this 
issue, and important trends in the development of international cooperation in 
combating terrorism. In addition, the basic documents of terrorist organizations, 
interviews with their leaders and followers are of interest. 
The problem of terrorism, in connection with its development into one of the 
global problems of our time, has been devoted to a considerable amount of research. 
In many of them, the emphasis is more on specific aspects of the manifestation of 
terrorism (for example, the relationship between terrorism and international drug 
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trafficking, the problem of separating terrorist organizations from criminal ones, the 
possibility of terrorists using nuclear weapons, cyberterrorism, the maritime aspect of 
the fight against terrorism, the information aspect of the fight against terrorism and 
etc.) and, to a lesser extent, on issues of direct anti-terrorist activities. 
Features of the development of the modern political system of the world and 
the problems of its adaptation to modern conditions were reflected in the works of 
A.D.Bogaturov, M.M.Lebedeva, A.Y.Melville, J.Naia, R.Cohen, J.Rosenau, and 
others. An alternative project of the world political system, advocated by 
transnational terrorists in place of the Western state-centric model that exists today, is 
devoted to the studies of M.M. Lebedeva, N.V.Zhdanov, A. Malashenko, V. Wagner, 
J. Esposito, B. Tibi. 
Among the western studies of the problems of terrorism, we can mention the 
collective work edited by M. Krenshaw, in which many prominent Western experts 
on terrorism reveal the characteristics of the activities of the main terrorist 
organizations of the 20th century, as well as the two-volume encyclopedic work 
edited by M. Krenshaw and J. Pimlogg "Encyclopedia of World Terrorism ", Which 
is the most complete overview of the work on terrorism. 
Among the peculiarities of transnational terrorism affecting the development of 
both national and international anti-terrorism measures, its transnational network 
structure is of particular interest. One of the fundamental works in this matter is the 
work of researchers from the American "RAND Corporation" J. Arkill, D. Ronfeldt 
and M. Zanini "Networks, network wars and terrorism of the information age". In 
addition, the work of E. Soloviev, M. Levitt, R. Paz, M. Sejman, D. Watts, the 
collective study edited by D. Rapoport and others are devoted to the analysis of 
terrorist networks. 
The issues of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's activities in countering 
terrorism were reflected in the studies of I. N. Komissnoy, A. A. Kurtov, A. Lukin, E. 
Merkulova, A. Mochulsky, M. Shaikhutdinov, G. Gleason, and others.  
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Research questions: 
1. What are the main directions of activity of International Anti-Terrorist 
Coalition? 
2.What is the essence the SCO strategy in the fight against terrorism, 
extremism and separatism?  
3. What is the place of the SCO in the multilateral cooperation in fighting 
against transnational terrorism?  
The methodological and theoretical basis of the thesis.The theoretical and 
methodological basis of the study is determined by the tasks listed above and is based 
on the principles of objectivity, concreteness, historicism, systemic character and the 
study of social phenomena. The paper uses qualitative research to understand the 
main causes and motivations of transnational terrorists and international 
organizations that are fighting it, in particular the SCO and to identify the main trends 
in multilateral cooperation in the fight against transnational terrorism. 
In addition, general scientific methods such as analysis, synthesis and 
comparative method have made it possible to comprehensively study multilateral 
cooperation as phenomena in the fight against transnational terrorism, to conduct a 
comparative analysis of the activities of various interstate organizations in the fight 
against transnational terrorism and to reveal the role of the SCO in this multilateral 
cooperation. 
When using legal and normative methods, regulatory legal documents dealing 
with the issue of multilateral cooperation in combating transnational terrorism and its 
specific features were studied. In the study, the place and role of the SCO in the fight 
against transnational terrorism also used a variety of methodological tools, techniques 
and scientific approaches to such related disciplines as philosophy, sociology, 
political science and history, which allowed the author to effectively and holistically 
investigate the problem posed. 
The novelty of the study.An analysis of the literature in this topic shows that 
there are a number of works in the world dedicated to the issue of combating 
transnational terrorism, the activities of international organizations that are struggling 
 
 
9 
 
with this global problem and at the same time researching the activities of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, etc. But,such problems as the role of the SCO in 
counter-terrorism as an intergovernmental organization and the multilateral 
cooperation in fight against the transnational terrorism have not been investigated. 
These problems were scrutinized for the first time in this thesis. From this point of 
view, the scientific novelty of this work is determined.In his work the author: 
- revealed the characteristics of modern transnational terrorism in accordance 
with the criterion of the significance of these features for multilateral anti-terrorist 
struggle; 
- traced the development of multilateral interstate cooperation in the fight 
against transnational terrorism;  
- reviewed the existing mechanisms to counter this threat within specific 
multilateral organizations, analyzed their functioning, assessed the compliance of the 
measures taken with the nature of the transnational terrorist threat and identified 
some problems in their activities; 
- analyzed the SCO strategy in the fight against terrorism, extremism and 
separatism, defined the place and role of the SCO in the multilateral struggle against 
transnational terrorism and showed the prospects for increasing the effectiveness of 
this organization in this direction. 
The theoretical and practical significance of the study is that the results 
contribute to the theoretical development of the approach to transnational terrorism 
and the identification of promising areas of research in this field, provide insight into 
the current state of multilateral antiterrorism cooperation at the global and regional 
levels, and identify the specifics of the participation of multilateral interstate 
institutions in the field of counteracting modern terrorism. The thesis is a new 
material for the preparation and teaching of courses on world politics and 
contemporary international relations. 
The structure of the thesis. The structure of the thesis is determined by the 
purpose and objectives of the study. The work consists of an introduction, three 
chapters (including a total of 9 paragraphs) conclusions and references. 
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I CHAPTER. TERRORISM AS A TRANSNATIONAL THREAT  
TO GLOBAL SECURITY 
1.1. The main features and definition of transnational terrorism 
Transnational terrorism is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. In the 
approach to the interpretation of this type of terrorism, many specialists often express 
opposing opinions. Even the name "transnational terrorism" is not universally 
accepted, as many authors use the terms international and transnational as synonyms 
(88, p.68), and in Azerbaijan Republic the modern terrorism is referred to primarily 
as international terrorism. There is also no single understanding of transnational 
terrorism at the international level, and in this work it is understood as terrorist acts 
aimed ultimately at destroying or destroying the modern political system of the 
world. Despite all the above difficulties in understanding transnational terrorism, one 
can nevertheless highlight some of its specific features. 
First, the main goal of transnational terrorism is the reconstruction of the world 
in other, more just, in the opinion of terrorists, principles. Thus, transnational 
terrorism is a method of implementing an alternative global project of political 
development. For a terrorist group, this is a major task. 
Secondly, the main actors of transnational terrorism are formally non-state 
organizations and groups (15, p.83). Basically, they carry out their activities on the 
territory of several states and have a sufficiently developed infrastructure, including 
government bodies, training camps for militants, etc. To structures of this type, the 
terrorist organization Al-Qaeda (58, p.58) can be classified. 
Thirdly, transnational terrorism poses a threat to international law and order 
and security, which always damages not only several states, but the entire political 
system as a whole. An example of such activities can serve as hostage taking, among 
which are citizens of different countries, or hijacking aircraft. This, however, does 
not exclude the fact that transnational terrorism poses a threat to the internal security 
of the states in whose territory the direct terrorist attacks take place. 
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Fourthly, there is constant cooperation between individual terrorist 
organizations. In recent years, the practice of providing mutual assistance to each 
other by personnel, experience, military-technical means, etc., has been increasingly 
extended by terrorist organizations. 
Speaking about multilateral cooperation in the fight against transnational 
terrorism, it is useful to identify the main features that distinguish it from terrorism of 
the past. According to J. Nye, the development of modern transnational terrorism is 
determined by two groups of factors (45, p.5). First, it is scientific and technological 
progress. Modern civilization consists of complex high-tech systems and is 
practically unthinkable without their uninterrupted functioning. However, as they 
become more complex, these systems become more vulnerable and fragile. As a 
result, this leads to the fact that the infrastructure becomes "vulnerable to local 
accidents, which, in turn, can cause large-scale or catastrophic accidents" (39, p.138). 
At the same time, progress "democratized technology", which made the tools 
of mass destruction more compact, cheaper and affordable for a wide range of 
individuals and groups. If before the bombs and watch mechanisms to them were 
bulky and expensive, now plastic explosives and digital timers to it are light and 
relatively cheap. As noted by J. Nye "Today, the cost of capturing an aircraft 
sometimes only slightly exceeds the price of an air ticket" (65, p.5). 
In addition, the widespread introduction of information technology makes it 
possible to use relatively inexpensive means of communication, allowing groups 
formerly operating within the jurisdiction of national law enforcement agencies to 
become global. Thirty years ago the instant communication system was quite 
expensive and only structures financially financed, in particular, national states, large 
transnational corporations, etc., could afford them. Today, thanks to the Internet, 
global communication has become almost free for anyone with access to a modem 
and a telephone line (66, p.247). In addition, the emergence and widespread use of 
the Internet has seriously reduced the costs of searching for information and 
establishing the necessary contacts. 
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Secondly, this is a change in the motivation and organization of terrorist 
groups. Terrorists in the mid-twentieth century had, as a rule, specific political goals 
related to the change in the political regime in a particular country, or the separation 
of part of the territory for the implementation of which large-scale terrorist acts were 
of little use. By the end of the 20th century, radical organizations had a new large-
scale task - the reconstruction of the modern world on the basis of supposedly Islamic 
religious values. Although nationalist and separatist terrorism continues to exist, the 
increased number of religiously motivated non-state terrorist groups with ambiguous 
goals that divide people into "believers" and others, leads to serious concern about the 
possible absence of any deterrent factors in the performance of terrorist acts, 
including with the use of weapons of mass destruction. As Walter Laqueurnoted, 
"traditional terrorists, whether of left or right wing, or national separatist, did not seek 
serious destruction ... Since then, terrorists have become more violent and less 
selective (in choosing their attacks' goals)" (43, p.234). The organization of terrorist 
groups has also changed. For example, Al-Qaeda, which had several tens of 
thousands of supporters organized around weakly connected cells in more than 60 
countries, is an unprecedented terrorist organization. But even in small networks it is 
now much more difficult to penetrate than into the hierarchical, almost military 
structures of terrorist organizations of the past. 
Both groups of technological and ideological factors contributed to the fact that 
terrorism became, on the one hand, more deadly, and on the other, more resistant to 
attempts at counteraction. 
The technological process made it possible for deviant groups and individuals 
to have such destructive possibilities as were formerly only for states and their armed 
forces. If in the past development of new destructive technologies required the 
concentration of powerful state resources, today this is no longer the case. The state's 
monopoly on the creation of new technologies seems to be also eroded. 
One of the most important features of modern transnational terrorism is its 
Islamization. It is necessary to determine the reasons why transnational terrorists 
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derive their inspiration from Islam and why they propose to replace the existing 
system of national states with the Islamic caliphate. 
Today, every fifth inhabitant of the land professes Islam. This religion is of a 
decentralized type, where many aspects of religious life remain at the discretion of 
the clerical authority at the local or regional levels, which allows us to interpret the 
Quran through various cultural prisms (48, p.78). However, Islam is not only a 
religion, but something more. As noted, for example, the famous American scholar of 
Islam J. Esposito "For most Muslims, Islam is a universal way of life ... Islam for 
them is inseparable from politics, legislation, education, public life and economics 
(24, p.156)." According to another researcher, Anwar Abd al-Malek, "Islam is more a 
social concept of the national order, social evolution, and progress than the ordinary 
religious movement" (24, p.156). 
As writes A.B. Kudryavtsev, the majority of extremist groups acting under the 
banner of Islam, derive their origin from the Society of Muslim Brothers, which 
Hasan-ul-Banna founded in Egypt in the late 1920s (40). Having emerged as a 
religious organization for "correcting the morals" of Muslims, the "Muslim 
Brotherhood" quickly turned into a semblance of a political party with a clear 
ideology. 
At the moment there are at least half a thousand sectarian sects, the most 
famous of which are Al Qaeda and the World Front against Jews and Crusaders, 
created by bin Laden in 1988 and 1998 respectively, Egyptian Al Jihad, "Al-Jama'a 
al-Islamiya", the "Ansar al-Islam", the "Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan" operating 
in Iraq, etc. Extremism and terrorism in the Islamic world come not from Islam itself, 
but from the sum of factors that determine the favorable ground for terrorism in a 
number of states in this world. 
In modern conditions, terrorism is also an instrument of struggle, but no longer 
tactical, as it was before, but of a strategic nature(70, p.49). International terrorists 
operating under the flag of radical Islam, in fact, offer the world a global project, an 
alternative to the Western one. According to Zeyno Baran, "... the West is trying to 
draw into a clash between two rival ideologies in the Islamic world. Supporters of the 
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first ideology believe that Islam can be combined with secular democracy and basic 
civil liberties. Supporters of the second are committed to the idea of replacing the 
existing world system with a new caliphate, i.e. global Islamic state "(2, p.53). 
Another important aspect of modern terrorism is the change in the structure and 
functioning of the group itself. In the past, terrorist organizations were closed, 
underground cells with a hierarchical structure, led by a leader, and the members of 
the organization were in constant contact with each other (9, p.413). 
An important factor of modern terrorism is the development of mass media, 
including electronic media. It is thanks to the media that terrorists, after having 
committed one terrorist attack, cause a resonance all over the world and draw the 
attention of the entire world public to the defended goal. Without newspapers, radio 
and television, terrorists would not attract such attention and would not be able to 
create an atmosphere of fear. With the widespread use of mass media, it became 
possible to turn them into a tool for manipulating the mass consciousness. As S. 
Tsytsarev points out, "In the era of the domination of the media, terrorism has 
acquired completely new qualities. Therefore, for example, the murder of Emperor 
Paul I, which was an act of terrorism in order to change the political regime, and the 
murder of Ahmad Qadyrov are two completely different events ... Now terrorists are 
sure that they always have involuntary "allies" - the mass media information that 
everyone will show and all will be frightened. And the better the media work, the 
more information they give - the more effective the intimidation will be "(93). 
Perhaps that is why the terrorists began to conduct a kind of "show terror" (49, 
p.133), designed for the general public and "beautiful recognizability" (105), and not 
only to inflict maximum damage or harm. The specific "advertising" character of 
modern terrorism, characterized by the desire to spread panic among the masses, to 
direct the demonstrative effect of terror to the maximum number of people, can be 
attributed to the development factor of the media.  
Modern terrorist acts are, as a rule, large-scale and with a large number of 
victims (32, p.59). Terrorism has become "blind" or massive. In part, this can be 
explained by the fact that in today's religiously motivated terrorism, there is a clear 
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distinction between "those who are with us and those who are against us." The latter, 
naturally, are subject to destruction. In addition, a democratic form of government 
presupposes the full power of the people. Accordingly, it is the population that should 
become the main object of terror, so that subsequently they make correct conclusions 
in the elections and referendums and obey the demands of terrorists. 
In most of the high-profile terrorist attacks of recent years, as successful, and 
not, terrorist organizations have actively used suicide bombers. For the first time, 
Tamil Tigers from Sri Lanka, and now actively used by both Palestinian terrorists and 
Chechens, suicide bombers are still a relatively new phenomenon in terrorism. (31, 
p.242) Previously, terrorists still tried to communicate their demands and stay alive. 
The use of suicide bombers is probably related to the toughening of the position of 
states towards terrorists, which consists in refusing to negotiate with them and the 
general tendency towards their physical destruction. Thus, the use of suicide bombers 
can be considered a response to increased measures to counter terrorists by the state. 
 
1.2. Causes of terrorist activity at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries  
The events of September 11, 2001 gave impetus to the fact that researchers, 
politicians, reviewers and experts began to discuss the causes of terrorist activities 
with renewed vigor. The commonplace of these analyzes was confusion with the 
motives of terrorists, assumptions about the conditions conducive to or leading to 
such actions, as well as general judgments about recommendations that would help 
eliminate the causes of terrorist activity. Such a search for answers to many questions 
of terrorist activity is quite understandable, especially given the fact that the 
participants in the antiterrorist coalition were faced with the question of developing 
measures to counter terrorism in the long term. Although the scale of the terrorist 
action of September 11 is unprecedented, the questions that the experts tried to find 
answers have already sounded more than once. There are many attempts to explain 
the causes of terrorism and they are valuable material necessary for understanding the 
nature of the current terrorist threat (11; 15). 
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After the disintegration of the bipolar system, international relations are in a 
transitional state. The erosion of the Westphalian state-centered political system of 
the world, on the basic principles of which international relations have existed for 
more than 350 years, leads to the emergence of new transnational actors of 
international relations, such as transnational corporations, non-governmental 
international organizations, intra-state regions and even individual individuals (46, 
p.77). The state, while remaining, of course, the leading actor on the world stage, no 
longer has a monopoly on international activity, as it was before. Moreover, a number 
of states are already losing their economic potential to large transnational companies 
(45, p.138). Thus, it becomes obvious that the state-centered political structure of the 
world requires, at a minimum, an adaptation to the current situation, and, as a 
maximum, a replacement for a new one that fully reflects the current state of affairs 
in the international sphere. 
During this period of uncertainty about the future of the world political system, 
an alternative project of the world political system arises, designed to replace the 
Western model of the nation-state, which presupposes the creation of a global Islamic 
caliphate and promoted by terrorist methods. To date, there are a number of 
approaches to explaining the reasons for the emergence of this transnational terrorist 
movement in the Muslim world, but among the hypotheses put forward, there are 
three main approaches to which M.M. Lebedeva, analyzing the principles of the 
development of the conflicts of the XXI century, to which she also includes 
transnational terrorism (44, p.271). 
The first proceeds from the existence between the Western and Islamic worlds 
of fundamental value irreconcilable contradictions. This hypothesis is based mainly 
on the idea of a possible intercivilizational conflict put forward by the American 
political scientist Samuel Huntington in the pages of Foreign Affairs in 1993 in the 
article "The Collision of Civilization?" (33; 34). The main idea of S. Huntington is 
that there is a growing and fundamental cultural as well as ideological incompatibility 
between the Christian and Muslim civilizations, which will eventually lead to the 
next big confrontation after the end of the Cold War, where on the one hand a 
 
 
17 
 
militant Islam, and on the other, the modernization model advocated by Western 
countries. If the origins of the current threat of transnational terrorism are indeed in 
the value plane, then it is unlikely to overcome this threat in the short term. If 
Huntington is right and a large-scale intercivilizational conflict, preceded by 
transnational terrorism, really comes, then in order to successfully cope with this 
problem, it is likely that the Western world will need to apply classical force methods 
of suppressing resistance. However, this solution to the problem will be correct only 
if the theory of S. Huntington is correct and the approaching intercivilizational 
conflict is exactly what we are now observing. 
Close to the idea of S. Huntington about the "clash of civilizations", one can 
also assume that transnational terrorism is a reaction of rejection of the process of 
Westernization that is taking place in the world. It, unlike globalization, is a fairly old 
phenomenon, implying the spread of social, economic and political modern Western 
values and structures in the world (capitalism, rationalism, industrialization, 
bureaucracy, language, culture, etc.), first of all American. The processes of 
Westernization interfere with the development of local cultures, suppressing identity.  
The actions of Islamic fundamentalism, ideologically fueling transnational 
terrorism, may be a reaction to an attempt to westernize the Muslim world from 
Western countries, and above all the United States. The aggravation of contradictions 
does not occur on an interdenominational basis, but as a result of a reaction to 
attempts to Westernize the Muslim world, which, as already noted, is increasingly 
tuned to the implementation of its own global alternative to the Western one (105). 
The second hypothesis regarding the causes of the emergence of transnational 
terrorism is in the economic plane and assumes that it is a response to the growing 
gap between the "global North" and the "global South" and, in particular, the 
international forces of globalization (20). One of the forms of globalization is the 
process of the formation on a global scale of a single financial, information and 
economic space based on new, mainly computer technologies (23, p.62). 
The main barrier to participation in this process is the low level of education 
and poverty, which is characteristic of the developing world and prevents it from 
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using the results of the globalization process. At the same time, the unity of the 
market provides a general and unprecedented sharpness of competition, in which the 
developed countries primarily benefit. As a result, modern processes lead to a 
deterioration in the conditions of the existence of the main (and at the same time all 
the time increasing) part of humanity due to the acceleration of the development and 
growth of the welfare of its absolute minority, the so-called. «Golden billion». Due to 
the peculiarities of historical development, most of the poor live in Muslim countries 
today. If the gap between 20% of the poorest and 20% of the richest parts of the 
world population in the XX century was 3 units, today it reached 86 (105). As a 
result, the modern world has become similar to a pyramid: the top is a group of 
highly developed industrial states, below is an average country. Together they make 
up only one-tenth of humanity. At the bottom of the pyramid is the rest, the "third" 
world, i.e. the remaining nine-tenths of the world's population. It is in the "third 
world" countries that the forces that perceive such civilizational construction as 
socially unfair appeared and became active. Unable to use legitimate methods of 
fighting the emerging world order, and because of its historical, political and social 
development, as well as the apparent superiority of the Western military machine, 
they choose the terrorist method, motivating it with the need to protect Islamic 
values. However, the connection directly with Islam is less obvious because it is more 
connected with the social and economic situation of Muslims, the conditions of their 
lives, which daily reproduce the nutrient medium for the growth and strengthening of 
the sense of injustice. Social stratification and political schism in societies around the 
world have discarded the majority of the population as social outcasts and have 
engendered a huge mass of marginal that create the basis for the formation of a 
transnational terrorist "international". Thus, terrorism against the US and the Western 
world can be seen as a form of protest against globalization, which Western countries 
are actively propagating, and a growing social and economic stratification. (16, p.54) 
However, one should not overestimate the significance of this factor, the more it 
should be absolutized. Muslim countries cannot be attributed, even purely 
geographically, to the "global South", they are located in the so-called buffer zone 
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between the "North" and "South". Transnational terrorism is born not by poverty and 
by the desire of the destitute to achieve a higher standard of living. As GI writes. 
Mirsky, "The problem of poverty and material backwardness does not occupy a 
central place in the ideology of extremists, and they themselves do not belong to the 
descendants of the poorest sections of the population" (38, p.213). The third proposed 
hypothesis boils down to the fact that the causes of transnational terrorism lie in the 
response to the hegemonic, unilateral and often unfair foreign policy of the United 
States, which causes discontent in many parts of the world (71, p.268). For example, 
M. Crenshaw believes that modern manifestations of terrorism are the result of the 
expansion of the civil war in the world system. In her view, the greater US exposure 
to transnational terrorism is the result of their growing influence abroad, and terrorist 
attacks on US interests are an attempt to achieve radical political changes in other 
countries. M. Crenshaw considers terrorist acts, and in particular the events of 
September 11, as "a strategic reaction to American influence in the context of a 
globalized civil war" (12, p.427). And the United States, which always supports 
Israel's position unconditionally, is also responsible for the fact that this conflict has 
not yet been resolved. 
It is necessary to do colossal analytical work at the level of analysis of the 
international system in order to confirm or refute the hypotheses put forward. These 
areas of analysis have not been developed in large part because studies of terrorism 
and international relations hardly ever intersect, and different visions of problems and 
methods have led to the formation of established views and opinions prevailing in 
each of the areas of research. 
Another important factor in the rise and spread of transnational terrorism is an 
aspect of the crisis of the Westphalian world model, as an expansion of the number of 
"failed states", only on paper being national states, and in practice, lost all the 
necessary attributes of statehood. That is, the danger first of all is not represented by 
"rogue states", as they, according to the state-centric model of the world, want to see 
in Washington, namely "failed states" that cannot provide control over their territory 
and where terrorists have complete freedom of action (31, p.37). The examples of 
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Sudan and Afghanistan have clearly shown that "failed states" may well become a 
haven for terrorist organizations. The term "failed state" has many interpretations, but 
the general definition is that it is a state that does not correspond to the characteristics 
described in Max Weber's definition. In addition to monitoring all "actions taking 
place" in his jurisdiction, Weber writes that "the claims of a modern state to a 
monopoly in the use of force are just as important as compulsory jurisdiction and 
organizational constancy"(118, p.158). "Failed states" cannot provide control over 
their own sovereign territory, which creates conditions for the emergence of internal 
sources of instability. As a rule, such states are characterized by deteriorating living 
standards, corruption, lack of civil society and underdeveloped services (81, p.129). 
Thus, it is not surprising that terrorist groups are particularly active in those states 
where the political regime cannot actively oppose them or, in the case of the Sudan 
and Afghanistan, even depends in part on them (94, p.232). Competent states should 
be responsible for violent acts that occur as a result of the presence on their territory 
of terrorist organizations. But the "failed states" themselves are more "hostages" of 
terrorists than the root causes of terrorist activity (60, p.93). Such states attract 
terrorists because of the high degree of autonomy of actions they provide to terrorist 
organizations on their territory. This happens in many respects contrary to the wishes 
of the states themselves, since they cannot effectively control their territory. 
However, in the fight against transnational terrorism, one cannot concentrate 
exclusively on "failed" and "weak" states. Even if the state can consider itself 
relatively strong, this does not necessarily mean that it does not have separate 
territories with weak state control. That is why it is important to pay special attention 
to the so-called "unmanageable localities" or "uncontrolled territories" (3). The 
government of Israel calls them "X territories" (84, p.27). In the 1980s, the French 
researcher on terrorism, Kzawie Rofer, warned of imminent battles in the so-called 
"gray zones". He noted that uncontrolled territories, often marked on maps in gray, 
are "territories where the nation-state has completely disappeared, and the real power 
is in the hands of a coalition of militants and partisan detachments" (76, p.74). 
Although the "gray zones" are present in all regions of the world, the Arab world 
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becomes a region where "uncontrolled territories" and "failed states" appear more and 
more often. 
Transnational terrorism is an extremely complex phenomenon, the causes of 
which are, of course, complex. However, the fact remains that transnational terrorists 
come forward with an alternative project of the world political order because they 
consider the existing order to be unfair, first of all in relation to the rapidly 
developing and actively growing Muslim community. The need for such a project, 
which transnational terrorists try to realize, can be caused both by irreconcilable 
inter-civilizational contradictions and by the growing gap between poor countries, 
many of which are in the Muslim world, and rich states that take advantage of the 
globalizing world, as well as unfair and hegemonic foreign policy of the United 
States in Muslim countries. The study of the causes of transnational terrorist activity 
will help the antiterrorist coalition to choose effective measures to combat terrorism. 
It is extremely important not to make separate conclusions on specific cases of 
terrorism, but to create a system of scientific research in order to assess the lessons of 
past antiterrorist campaigns through the prism of their possible application in the 
future. The best solution will be an attempt to overcome conceptual, disciplinary, 
cultural and, sometimes, ideological differences in order that antiterrorist measures be 
based on an objective analysis of transnational terrorism. 
 
1.3. Characteristics of the development of transnational terrorism in modern 
conditions and the necessity for joint struggle against it 
Modern terrorist organizations, in terms of their activities, can be divided into 
three levels(79, p.235). At the lowest level, which represents the least danger for the 
world community, there are terrorists conducting operations within one state. At the 
next level, there are regional organizations operating in more than one country. At the 
highest level, there are organizations active in many countries and regions and setting 
global goals that can only be achieved through active international action. Although 
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for the purposes of this work, the greatest interest is of a global level, it is worthwhile 
to consider lower levels of activity, since it is quite possible that terrorist groups will, 
for ideological or religious reasons, cooperate, as well as participate in organizations 
of global. Then all three levels will be considered in more detail. 
Transnational terrorists. According to the information contained in the annual 
directory of the US State Department "Structures of World Terrorism 2003", six 
groups fall into this category(67, p.128): 
1. The Abu Nidal Organization; 
2. "al-Jemaah al-Islamiya" (Islamic group); 
3. Hezbollah (The Party of God); 
4. Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad); 
5. The organization "Mujahidin-i Kalk"; 
6. Al-Qaeda. 
It is these six groups that form the core of transnational terrorist activity. All 
these groups are radical, Islamist organizations that support the establishment of an 
Islamic Palestinian state in the territory of modern Israel, and also advocate 
minimizing the participation of the US and Western countries in the affairs of the 
Middle East and the creation of a new world order with the domination of Muslim 
values. All of the above organizations operate globally, supported by a network of 
cells in many countries around the world. They have the opportunity to strike almost 
anywhere in the world and their ultimate goal - the implementation of an alternative 
world political system threatens the whole system of nation-states. With the 
development of modern technologies, such as the Internet, as well as the possibility 
of free movement in many countries, these groups form a "virtual nation" that 
possesses many instruments of power, including information, military and economic 
means. The above organizations connect radical Islamic views and rejection of 
Western culture. 
Regional terrorists. Despite the fact that regional terrorists focus on their region 
and receive the lion's share of support from the population of neighboring countries, 
they nevertheless have connections both with terrorists at the global level and at the 
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state level. The international community still does not fully understand how 
interrelated all groups are at three levels, and in part, therefore, there is not yet a 
general understanding of the terrorist threat. Terrorist groups connect more than mere 
sympathy. They provide each other with financial, information and technological 
support in cases where it is beneficial to both parties. Terrorists at the regional level, 
although not as dangerous as global terrorists, remain the focus of attention of the 
world community, as effective measures to counter transnational terrorists should not 
bypass regional terrorist groups that can support them. 
Intra-state terrorists. Terrorists at this level operate in the territory of one state 
and, therefore, should be the object of attention of law enforcement bodies or armed 
forces of the country in which they carry out their operations. But even state-level 
terrorists support terrorists at the regional and global levels. For example, the 
Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone allegedly sold smuggled diamonds to Al-
Qaida, which it later resold for profit(26, p.93). Such mutually beneficial relations 
laid the foundation for possible further cooperation. 
Terrorist organizations have several opportunities for establishing links with 
each other. First, these are explicit links, i.e. direct interaction and cooperation 
between terrorist groups. Secondly, hidden links that are difficult to identify and 
break(17, p.18) 
Explicit connections. Terrorist organizations work together if this is in their 
common interest. They may have different ideologies, goals, opponents, financial 
sources, but there are also reasons for cooperation. This is followed by a brief 
description of the known obvious links between terrorist organizations. 
Financial support. It can manifest itself in a variety of forms, from direct 
financial transfers to joint high-profit shadow business projects, like drug trafficking, 
arms trafficking or the illegal sale of diamonds. In addition, large financial revenues 
come from charitable organizations and legal enterprises that deal with money 
laundering(25, p.46). 
Exchange of intelligence. Terrorist organizations sometimes exchange 
information on military operations of Western countries, their weaknesses, methods 
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of gathering information, opportunities to counter terrorism, political situation, etc. 
They exchange information in order to keep abreast of the latest developments and to 
clarify their further actions(50, p.125). 
Team work. Terrorist organizations coordinated their actions to enhance the 
psychological effect of terrorist operations or to demonstrate their ability to conduct 
long-term, lengthy operations(17, p.19). 
Providing shelters. Many terrorist organizations have training camps or 
operational bases close to each other. Such hideouts are also used by members of 
other, friendly terrorist organizations(84, p.27). 
Exchange of materials and resources. Terrorists exchange information on the 
construction of bombs and the ways in which they are used. In addition, they transmit 
to each other and materials for making bombs. This is especially dangerous, given the 
fact that terrorists are trying to gain access to weapons of mass destruction(56, p.58). 
Exchange of staff. Closely related organizations exchange operational staff for 
further training or use for intelligence purposes, including to master new methods, 
such as the transfer of encrypted and coded messages, falsification of documents or 
transfer under another's name. Hidden links between terrorist organizations are 
difficult to determine. That is why very much is based on assumptions(27). 
Separation of opportunities. When one terrorist organization strikes, others can 
take advantage of the situation. For example, while the US coped with the 
consequences of the terrorist attacks of September, a terrorist organization or a 
terrorist sent out letters with anthrax disputes, thus demonstrating the possibility of an 
effective terrorist attack even in conditions of increased security measures(28, p.142). 
Division of responsibility. One terrorist organization can perpetrate a terrorist 
act, and take another responsibility for it. This can be done in order to complicate the 
response process, to hide the real ones responsible for the attack and to draw attention 
to the organization that formally assumed responsibility(7, p.114). 
"Public diplomacy". Some terrorist organizations have the capacity to access or 
influence the media to promote their goals or support other terrorist organizations(72, 
p.72). 
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Shared ideological views. The ideological leaders of one terrorist organization 
can show support to other terrorist organizations or call for general actions in support 
of certain values or against a common enemy(83, p.19). 
While it is global terrorism that is the main threat to the international 
community, it is supported by terrorist organizations at lower levels. These 
connections are sometimes not always obvious and may require a large number of 
separate coordinated anti-terrorist actions at all three levels. It is in connection with 
the existence of such links that any antiterrorist strategy should be comprehensive. 
To combat such a ramified terrorist network, it is necessary to understand the 
interrelationships that exist between different terrorist groups. Below are just three 
examples: 
1. In November 2001, the US government announced the AL-Taqwa banking 
system as a terrorist organization because of "providing a mechanism for transferring 
money to Al-Qaeda" (95). Al-Taqwa itself also financed other terrorist groups, for 
example, Hamas. In fact, Al-Taqwa was not only initially created for donations by 
supporters of the Egyptian organization Muslim Brotherhood, but the members of 
Hamas and other persons seen in connection with Al-Qaeda were among its main 
shareholders (109). According to the testimony of US Deputy Secretary of Treasury 
Juan Zarate, "annual donations of 60 million US dollars for Hamas' needs passed 
through the bank accounts of Al-Taqwa Bank. Back in 1996, a report from the Italian 
intelligence service stated that Al-Taqwa was not only linked to Hamas and other 
Palestinian groups, but also to the Algerian terrorist organization The Armed Islamic 
Group and the Egyptian al-Jemaah al- Islamia"(108). 
2. According to court documents, two people played a key role in the 
radicalization, training and financing of the cell of American Muslims in Portland, 
which later tried to enter Afghanistan through Hong Kong in order to fight against 
Al-Qaida and the Taliban Armed Forces. One of the leaders of the Portland cell was 
connected with Palestinian terrorism, and the other directly with Al Qaeda. 
According to court documents, Ali Khalid Steity, a supporter of Hamas, who 
underwent terrorist training in a camp in southern Lebanon, along with another 
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unknown member of the Portland cell, held classes on possession of small arms. 
Steithie himself had several firearms, "which was used by the members of the cell to 
teach shooting skills so that they could later help those forces that were in 
Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban, including the al Qaeda militants(112, p.153). 
Co-founder of the World Aid Fund, closely associated with Al-Qaeda, co-operated 
with Steith Mohammed Abdirahman Harye. According to the FBI's written 
testimony, the members of the cell were secretly recorded on videotape at the time 
when Hari, an imam of the local mosque, instructed his followers to fight against 
American troops along with their Muslim brothers. Karye gave the cell members 2 
thousand American dollars, which he received from parishioners of the mosque, to 
cover transportation costs. In other testimonies, Jeffrey Buttle, also a member of the 
cell from Portland, explains that on the eve of Steithi's arrest in October 2001, 
"Brown ordered groups that could not enter Afghanistan to return to the United 
States" (120). 
3. In May 2003, a number of European countries, together with the United 
States, froze the accounts of the Al-Aqsa International Fund, an organization closely 
linked to Hamas, which used the funds of the fund to finance Palestinian militants, 
"spending as" donations to charity projects(111). "It is also interesting that the 
representative of Al-Aqsa in Yemen, Mohammed Ali Hasan al-Moayyad, was 
arrested not only for financing Hamas, but also for providing money, weapons, 
communications and recruits to Al-Qaeda. According to the report of the Israeli 
special services on the international activities of Hezbollah, the head of the section of 
the International Al-Aqsa Foundation in Holland reported that his office, together 
with the main branch of the organization in Germany, was collecting funds for 
Hezbollah(35). 
The examples of the interaction of terrorist groups both explicit and implicit 
links between organizations of global, regional and state levels, discussed 
above.First, it is obvious financial support between different terrorist organizations of 
Islamist persuasion. It should be specially noted that, as with the Al-Takva bank 
accused of transferring money to Al-Qaida, Hamas, the Armed Islamic Group and 
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Al-Jemaah al-Islamiya, and with the International Al-Aksa Foundation, which 
donated money donated to charity, terrorist organizations, in particular Hamas, it is 
not a question of any shadow business to finance terrorist activities. Both 
organizations, before they were interested in law enforcement bodies, acted openly 
and were on the legal position. This is another reminder of the terrorists' ability to 
receive funding from legitimate sources, as well as the vulnerabilities and 
shortcomings of both the international banking system and the network of charitable 
Islamic organizations. Secondly, for example, in the case of the Portland cell in the 
United States, jointly created by representatives of Al-Qaeda and Hamas, there are 
cases of joint activities of terrorist organizations. The Portland group was trained to 
fight on the side of the Taliban in Afghanistan against a common enemy - the US and 
its armed forces, which is in the interests of both Al Qaeda and Hamas. But, of 
course, common denominators allowing cooperation with different Islamist terrorist 
organizations are common ideological views, which are the rejection of the Western 
model of the political organization of the world that is personified primarily by the 
United States, as well as by the local authorities under their influence. This, of 
course, is the key point, since the presence of common ideological positions will 
serve as a basis for further interaction of terrorist organizations at the global, regional 
and state levels. 
The history of the fight against terrorism at the international level begins in the 
second half of the 1920s. XX century, when, in accordance with the decision of the 
First International Congress of Criminal Law (Brussels, 1926), held under the 
auspices of the International Association of Criminal Law, a series of conferences 
devoted to the problem of terrorism was held. The main areas of cooperation on 
combating terrorism at the state level were determined precisely in the course of these 
international forums. 
The first such conference, held in 1927, adopted a document in which an 
attempt was made to disclose the notion of an international crime and to give a 
criminal-legal assessment of this phenomenon. It also stressed the need for criminal 
prosecution and punishment of persons for committing the most dangerous crimes 
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that threaten public security. One of the first steps in organizing international 
cooperation against terror was the adoption by the Assembly of the League of 
Nations in 1937. Draft International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Acts of Terrorism. This convention has not been ratified and has not entered into 
force. 
The Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, adopted by 
the UN General Assembly in 1994, almost 60 years later, reiterated the need to 
strengthen cooperation in the fight against terrorism and reaffirmed the responsibility 
of States to take all possible measures to eliminate it. 
But by the beginning of the 21st century it became clear that the threat of 
terrorism had grown to a global level, and the international community has not been 
able to cope with it yet. The global anti-terrorist war declared by the US can be 
considered an attempt to implement high-tech plans to change from outside regimes 
in the territories from which a real or virtual terrorist threat comes and the subsequent 
use of technologies to create a "new statehood" there. Examples of such actions were 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Leaving aside the whole complex of unavoidable social, 
economic, cultural and other consequences of US policy, it can be argued that in the 
field of international relations this policy has convincingly demonstrated all the 
weaknesses of the outgoing system of maintaining peace and security, as well as the 
pitfalls that complicate the process of forming a new world order . She proved, in 
particular, that the use of the armed forces cannot serve as a universal way of 
countering terrorism. 
Judging by the conflicts in the Near and Middle East, the ability of the regular 
army to fight irregular terrorist groups is very limited. At the same time, it should be 
specially emphasized: today there is no evidence that the antiterrorist methods used 
by states contribute to the solution of the very problem of terrorism. Moreover, the 
use of military force can stimulate its development. It also generates a whole range of 
problems affecting interstate relations. All this sharply reduces the effectiveness of 
the "army" option and requires the search for other ways of countering terrorism. 
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The international community has come to the conclusion that, in addition to the 
already existing international instruments of the United Nations, and in order to 
create a unified legal framework for international cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism, to work out a Comprehensive Convention on Combating International 
Terrorism. A corresponding initiative was put forward in 1996 by India at the 51st 
meeting of the UN General Assembly. Resolution "Measures to eliminate 
international terrorism", adopted at the 53rd session of the UN General Assembly in 
1998. 
Success in the fight against terrorism can only be achieved by joint efforts of 
representatives of interested countries. This would be facilitated by the holding on a 
regular basis of bilateral and multilateral meetings of heads of departments, special 
units, experts who are solving the tasks of countering terrorism. The creation of joint 
structures, joint preparation and holding of scientific conferences, meetings of 
specialists in the fight against terrorism are becoming topical. 
Among the possible areas of international cooperation, we can note the holding 
of joint operational activities; exchange of technologies and experience in the 
production and use of technical and military means; development and improvement 
of the legislative framework and international legal norms on cooperation in the fight 
against terrorism; the definition of a system of principles and concepts necessary to 
determine common approaches to assessing events and problems related to terrorist 
activities in any country or region; development of legal norms regulating the use of 
the territory of another state for the release of hostages and actions against terrorists; 
determination of the place and role of the media with a view to shaping world public 
opinion in terms of intolerance towards terrorism and balanced submission of 
materials; enhancing the role of non-governmental organizations and independent 
experts in expanding international cooperation on combating terrorism. 
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AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL 
2.1. The role of the UN in the fight against terrorism as a universal 
intergovernmental organization 
Since its creating at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, the UN has dealt 
with a wide range of issues affecting international stability and security. One of the 
main achievements of the UN during the Cold War period was that it could offer 
effective mechanisms for the relationship between the two superpowers that emerged 
in the world after the Second World War and prevent a major armed conflict between 
them. However, in the 1990s, the UN had to look for ways to counter a number of 
new threats to international security from internal conflicts in Europe, Africa and the 
former Soviet Union, as well as from the phenomenon of international terrorism. In 
the 1990s, the UN, like other international organizations established in the bipolar 
period of international relations, faced the challenge of reforming its activities and 
adapting to the new realities of the post-bipolar world. In particular, the UN began to 
pay more attention to the problems of terrorist activities in the world, although 
international terrorism was first attracted to it in 1948 after the murder of Count 
Folke Bernadotte in Palestine (47). During the 1990s, the UN Security Council 
imposed sanctions on the whole a number of states that support terrorist organizations 
and terrorist activities. These were mostly economic sanctions, the effectiveness of 
which, in many cases, was controversial. The events of September 11, 2001 forced 
the UN to drastically revise its tools for combating terrorism. 
In the first months after the tragedies in New York and Washington, the UN 
and the US cooperated more than ever. The Security Council adopted a series of 
resolutions condemning these monstrous terrorist acts and opening the way for a 
military operation against terrorists and their hideout countries. It was not without the 
participation of the UN that a global antiterrorist coalition was formed, which 
included most of the world's countries, concerned about the growing opportunities for 
transnational terrorism. With the full support of the Security Council, the United 
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States and its allies carried out a military operation in Afghanistan, aimed at 
overthrowing the Taliban regime and destroying the training camps of the 
international terrorist network Al-Qaeda in that country. It seemed that the global 
antiterrorist campaign would help the UN find its new mission, which had been 
talked about so much since the early 1990s. The fight against transnational terrorism 
could become one of those areas that, on the one hand, will unite different countries, 
and on the other, will help to reform the UN in accordance with the new realities of 
the post-bipolar world(77, p.147). 
On the same day, when the terrorists captured planes rammed the towers of the 
World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon building in Washington, the UN 
Security Council chairman, Permanent Representative of the French Republic to the 
United Nations, Jean-David Levitte, circulated a draft version of the resolution 
severely condemning this terrorist attack and already On September 12, resolution 
1368 was unanimously adopted by the Security Council. Two weeks later, resolution 
No. 1373 was adopted obliging all 191 UN member states to adopt appropriate 
domestic legislation to prevent further manifestations of international terrorism (78). 
The US permanent representative to the United Nations, John Negroponte, called the 
UN "a faithful partner in troubled times" and characterized resolution No. 1373 as 
"the most significant separate contribution" of the UN to the fight against terrorism. 
Both of the above resolutions set a high standard for recognizing the legitimacy of 
military operations in response to acts of terrorism and a worldwide ban on terrorist 
activities was carried out. 
Prior to the adoption of Resolution No. 1368, the use of force in response to 
terrorist acts was generally condemned by the UN General Assembly in accordance 
with the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the 
Internal Affairs of States of 1981 and the Declaration on Enhancing the Efficiency of 
the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force international relations of 
1987 (47). In particular, the General Assembly, on the initiative of several Arab 
countries, as well as the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic 
 
 
32 
 
Conference, has repeatedly condemned all military actions of Israel in response to the 
terrorist acts carried out "the Liberation Army of Palestine". 
Based on the right of self-defense of each state against acts of aggression and 
thus legitimizing the unilateral use of force in response to terrorist acts, the UN 
Security Council created a dangerous precedent by resolution 1368, which calls into 
question the general prohibition on the use of force enshrined in the UN Charter. 
This contradiction in the future should be the subject of consideration of 
experts on international law. In its letter informing the UN Security Council about the 
military actions against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the United 
States is reporting that "Our investigation is at an early stage. We can find out that 
additional measures will be required for our self-defense against other organizations 
and other states" (14). This statement somewhat alarmed diplomats from different 
countries and experts in the field of international law, since the absence of a 
universally recognized definition of terrorism could lead to abuses by the United 
States. However, China and Russia quickly joined the US position. China considered 
that it would help him in solving the problem of Tibet, and Russia saw in this position 
a precedent in order to take the fight with the Chechen separatists outside the Russian 
Federation. 
The consequences of the adoption of Resolution No. 1368 and its impact on the 
legality of the use of military force also poses a problem that can subsequently lead to 
legal conflicts between states. The Security Council had practically no opportunity to 
consider this issue in detail, since the resolution was adopted on September 12, i.e. 
only a day after the terrorist attacks that shocked the whole world. 
On September 28, 2001, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 
1373, which required all UN member states to amend or adopt domestic legislation 
that would outlaw terrorist acts, including supporting and financing such acts; 
prohibiting the harboring of terrorists and providing them with any other assistance, 
including weapons; and also ordered operational cooperation with other states in 
meeting these requirements. 
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Some of the proposed measures are not new and have already been contained 
in two important conventions developed in the 1990s: the International Convention 
for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, which came into force in May 2001 and 
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 
which by the time terrorist of the acts of 11 September had not yet entered into force 
(this happened in April 2002) (18). Prior to the events of 11 September, only Cuba 
and the United Kingdom ratified both conventions. After the adoption of resolution 
No. 1373 all provisions of both conventions became binding. 
The implementation of the provisions of Resolution No. 1373 is monitored by 
the Counter-Terrorism Committee under the UN Security Council. The first chairman 
of the committee was the Permanent Representative of Great Britain to the United 
Nations, Jeremy Greenstock. During his presidency, Jeremy Greenstock stressed the 
technical nature of the work of the CTC, limiting its functions to "monitoring, 
analyzing and presenting facts for consideration by the Security Council". According 
to him, the purpose of the committee's work is "to help the world community improve 
mechanisms to prevent terrorists from gaining free space for their actions, money, 
support and shelter, and create a network for information exchange and a field of 
joint action" (17, p.73). 
In September 2002, the UN Monitoring Group on Sanctions against the Taliban 
and Al Qaeda reported that terrorist organizations still have access to a fair amount of 
financial and economic resources. In particular, her report says that although in the 
first days after the events of September 11, bank accounts were frozen for a total of 
112 million, US dollars, in the following months, accounts were blocked only for a 
total of $ 10 million. The conclusion of the report concludes that Al-Qaeda is more 
than viable in most parameters and is ready for new terrorist attacks at any time. (59, 
p.48)" 
The same problems prevent the implementation of the provision on the 
prohibition of harboring terrorists included in resolution No. 1373(78). For example, 
in many countries border control in itself is a big problem, being weak and 
inefficient. A number of states cannot fully control their own territory on their own 
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and needs additional resources. The CTC with a small staff and rather modest budget 
simply does not have enough resources to provide the necessary assistance. Only if 
the CTC is given additional powers will it help countries to create mechanisms for 
the implementation of all antiterrorist legislation, which is particularly important in 
the global fight against terrorism: 
In order to achieve this, the CTC should become a "permanent, international 
and professional expert body", which will work day by day with the Security Council 
and monitor the implementation of all provisions of resolution No. 1373. Such a body 
will be able to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the provisions of 
resolution No. 1373. 
To date, the CTC has two major problems that can affect the quality of its 
work: 
1. The CTC is not in a position to provide assistance to States independently. 
The committee can only tell the states how to solve these or other problems. 
2. The CTC may become a body that duplicates the work of other UN entities, 
for example, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime or other structures within 
the UN system that deal with various aspects of the terrorist threat(47, p.51). 
Having ordered all the UN member states to adopt the appropriate legislation 
and carry out actions to combat terrorism on their territory and abroad, the UN 
Security Council has turned the fight against terrorism into a category of global 
development problems. Although the beginning is good and, perhaps, it is even the 
most effective way in the fight against terrorism at the international level, there are 
still a number of unresolved political problems. 
Despite all the problems, the UN's activities in the fight against terrorism are 
continuing. In particular, the UN Secretary-General's Report "Uniting against 
Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy" of April 27, 
2006 provides an important framework for developing common approaches to the 
issue of combating terrorism. But on the basis of this report, and taking into account 
the revisions presented by Spain, Singapore and Pakistan, on September 8, 2006, the 
General Assembly adopted the first in the history of the United Nations Global 
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Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which formulated the main provisions of the anti-
terrorist struggle for the UN member states. Based on the content of the above 
documents, it can be concluded that the United Nations has taken a course toward 
creating a universal atmosphere of non-acceptance of terrorism as a method of 
political struggle, regardless of its possible motivation. Most likely, it is in this area 
that the UN will be able to achieve the most significant results. 
Member countries, however, have not yet been able to agree on a draft 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, which has been under 
discussion for several years. This is largely due to the contradictions regarding the 
development of a universal, acceptable definition of terrorism, primarily in 
connection with the desire of some members of the United Nations (Syria, Libya, 
Egypt and Pakistan) to extend the scope of the convention to the actions of the armed 
forces of states. Proposals of a number of states to withdraw from the convention 
whole categories of violent acts of a terrorist nature, on the contrary, are not legally 
justified and, moreover, politically dangerous. In many respects, in order to avoid 
this, the Security Council in September 2005 adopted resolution No. 1624, which 
emphasizes that no motivation should justify terrorism and calls for the commission 
of terrorist acts(119). 
In the 1990s, the lack of faith on the part of the United States in the possibility 
of effective UN work in the post-bipolar period significantly devalued the role of this 
organization in international affairs. Washington did not see the UN as an effective 
mechanism for regulating the new system of international relations that developed 
after the end of the cold war and did not want to finance programs in which the US 
did not actively participate. Nevertheless, after the events of September 11, the UN 
attempted to join the international anti-terrorist struggle in the 21st century, 
supporting the US military operation in Afghanistan and obliging all member states 
to implement the previously reached agreements on antiterrorist issues. But to date, 
the UN has almost exhausted all its capabilities to counter transnational terrorism. 
In order to effectively continue the efforts already made, significant changes 
are required, and, first of all, additional financial injections, including from the US. 
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Perhaps it is already time to move on to a new stage of development - the creation on 
the basis of the CTC of the UN Security Council of the International Anti-Terrorist 
Organization, the development of social programs aimed at preventing the spread, 
radical ideology of transnational terrorists among the poorest sections of the 
population of developing countries, aspiring to expand their anti-terrorist capabilities, 
but lacking the resources and experience. All of the above and much more can be 
implemented through the mechanisms of the UN. Undoubtedly, it still has to prove its 
importance in the new anti-terrorist campaign, and also to consolidate the key 
programs of the emerging integrated anti-terrorist strategy. Although this 
organization has been repeatedly criticized, it is the only universal international 
organization in the world and the largest in terms of the number of member countries. 
It is also important that her nearly sixty years of experience in solving the most acute 
problems of peace and security can become the basis for efforts to maintain peace 
and stability in the 21st century. 
The UN, however, has not been able to formulate for its member countries a 
clear and clear understanding of the threat of modern transnational terrorism, which 
seeks to replace the existing state-centered political system of the world with the 
global Islamic caliphate. Perhaps, it is on this that it should focus its attention in the 
future, being the most representative and the only universal international organization 
in the world. In addition, the UN can help shape the international rejection of 
terrorism as a method of political struggle, which is noted, in particular, in the report 
of K.Annan(113). 
On a practical level, the UN has reached the limit of its capabilities to date and 
its continued role in the fight against terrorism remains uncertain. Undoubtedly, the 
decision on the mandatory implementation of all UN anti-terrorism conventions and 
the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee under the Security Council, whose 
responsibilities include monitoring the implementation of the provisions of the 
conventions and resolutions on terrorist issues, have become important political 
decisions, but clearly insufficient. In particular, material constraints and a small 
number of employees do not allow the CTC to go beyond the analysis of country 
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reports and technical assistance to countries in need. In addition, the lack of both a 
mechanism for compelling to fulfill the requirements and encouraging countries to 
fulfill their requirements, inherent in all organizations as a whole, severely limits the 
impact of the UN, including on the issues of antiterrorist issues. Thus, the hopes that 
the international anti-terrorist campaign will help the UN find its place in the 
changing world and breathe new life into it are not justified. 
 
2.2. The anti-terrorist activities of NATO, as a regional military-political 
association 
In one of his articles, former Secretary General of the North Atlantic Alliance 
George Robertson noted that "the events of September 11 turned terrorism from the 
problem of internal security into a real threat to international security" (51). In 
response to this new global security challenge, NATO is expanding its role in 
counter-terrorism activities. Although terrorism was an integral part of the expanded 
post-bipolar security agenda, to date it has become one of the main objects of the 
alliance's attention. 
After the events of September 11, the dominance of antiterrorist tasks is quite 
clearly traced in the formation of the main goals and priorities of the North Atlantic 
Alliance. Less than twenty-four hours after the terrorist attacks on the United States 
on September 11, 2001, the US allies decided to launch, for the first time in history, 
the fifth article of the Washington Treaty, which states that "an attack on one 
member" of the alliance is "An attack on all members." Nevertheless, the North 
Atlantic alliance was not able to achieve active participation in the international anti-
terrorist campaign under the auspices of the United States. During the operation in 
Afghanistan, the gap in military capabilities between the forces of the European 
NATO member countries and the United States led to the fact that the latter only 
attracted to the military operation certain countries on a bilateral basis (mainly those 
that had special operations capabilities), and not all countries of the North Atlantic 
 
 
38 
 
Alliance. And while some NATO members played an important role in defeating the 
Taliban regime, the military operation in Afghanistan was predominantly the success 
of the US military. 
In January 2002, NATO forces were invited by the new Afghan government as 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under the auspices of the United 
Nations. Since the deployment, international forces have been under the command of 
NATO member countries. "On August 11, 2002, NATO assumed command of the 
international security assistance forces and from that moment is responsible for 
coordinating and planning all actions(6). This is NATO's first operation outside its 
Euro-Atlantic zone of responsibility". The ISAF contingent was primarily tasked with 
assisting the Afghan Transitional Administration in maintaining security in Kabul 
and its surrounding areas. In addition, the NATO contingent also helps the 
government of Afghanistan to create and develop its own law enforcement agencies. 
Provincial reconstruction teams have also been formed with the support of NATO in 
the field. These groups include both civilian specialists and military personnel whose 
tasks are to ensure the implementation of decisions of the central authorities in the 
Afghan provinces, as well as to create conditions for the safe implementation of the 
entire complex of activities for the revival of Afghanistan. 
European countries fully supported the United States in their desire to rid 
Afghanistan of Al Qaeda, but the subsequent war in Iraq in 2003 exposed all the 
difficulties regarding the possibility of reaching an international consensus on the 
legitimate aims of anti-terrorist operations(64). NATO member countries have not 
been able to come to a common opinion as to whether a military operation in Iraq can 
be considered as part of the fight against international terrorism and whether the 
United States has the right to conduct military operations bypassing the UN Security 
Council. Moreover, the war in Iraq has greatly complicated the process of obtaining 
and retaining broad European and international support for anti-terrorist operations. 
According to I.N.Kuklina, the split of the alliance on the issue of the US military 
operation in Iraq destroys the image of NATO as "the most powerful and effective 
military machine in the world"(42, p.176). 
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Since September 2001, NATO has developed the Partnership Action Plan on 
Terrorism and the military concept of protection from terrorism. The members of the 
alliance also committed to developing military capabilities that will help them 
conduct force operations against terrorists within the framework of the Prague 
initiatives and with the help of the established NATO Response Force. Initially, at the 
Prague Summit held in November 2002, the question of joining the alliance of new 
members was to be considered, but after the terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington, the main topic of the meeting was the transformation of the North 
Atlantic Alliance itself, reflecting the need to adapt and seek an answer to the 
question changes in the international security environment, in particular, the 
increased threat of transnational terrorism, which has become especially pronounced 
after the events of September 11, 2001(114). 
The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington have changed the 
international security environment, leaving two options for the future alliance: adapt 
to the new situation, especially in matters of organization, goals and objectives, in 
order to be in demand in a new security environment, or give way To other actors, 
which correspond to the realities of the current situation. This argument was 
advanced by a number of observers, including US Congress Senator Richard Jirapa, 
who noted that "if NATO cannot become effective in combating terrorism, our 
political leaders will be inclined to use another tool that meets today's requirements." 
Philip Gordon also follows this logic of reasoning, believing that "although the fight 
against terrorism changes the nature of NATO and carries many risks, it also 
demonstrates the relevance of NATO and gives an opportunity to renew the alliance 
whose future was in question, breathing new life into it." 
There are two main areas within which NATO has the opportunity to provide 
military assistance in the fight against terrorism. The North Atlantic alliance can 
independently conduct combat operations under its own command, as it was during 
the campaign in Kosovo in 1999, or it can facilitate the operations of the "voluntary 
coalition", adding, if necessary, its troops to the main forces of the anti-terrorist 
coalition. There are also two main types of military operations, where NATO military 
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forces can provide significant assistance in the fight against terrorism. First, it is the 
direct conduct of military operations against terrorist groups and their supporters. 
Secondly, these are military operations aimed at maintaining peace, such as forcing 
peace, and maintaining stability, both at the national and regional levels, in areas of 
increased terrorist activity. 
Based on this analysis, it is possible to create a small matrix relating to the 
possible military contribution of NATO to the campaign against terrorism, where 
four options for NATO military operations are possible. Based on this matrix, the US 
operation in Afghanistan "Enduring Freedom" will be considered as an international 
coalition operation with the support of NATO, and the deployment of an international 
security force as a peacekeeping operation already under the NATO command. 
NATO has developed a military concept for protection against terrorism, 
emphasizing its readiness to conduct military operations in response to terrorist 
attacks or the threat of such attacks, and deploy its forces "where it is necessary to 
carry out such tasks." 
In addition, the North Atlantic Alliance is developing the NATO Response 
Force - highly mobile, technologically advanced elite units, which must be deployed 
within five days and independently conduct operations within a month. These forces 
became fully operational at the end of November 2006, as announced at the NATO 
summit in Riga. According to preliminary data, these units are best prepared for 
conducting anti-terrorist operations. If this is the case, then NATO, if necessary, may 
have the opportunity to conduct independent anti-terrorist operations from the end of 
2006 to the beginning of 2007. However, do not underestimate NATO's ability to 
conduct peacekeeping operations. Moreover, most likely, it is in this area that the US 
may need NATO assistance, given its previous experience. 
In addition, we should not discount the existing special forces of NATO 
countries, including, in the opinion of US President George W. Bush, an important 
element of the capabilities of the North Atlantic alliance. During Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan, Special Forces from Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, 
Turkey, Britain and Greece played an important role. "The special forces of these 
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countries often operated in various operations under the command of the United 
States, including the detection of hiding members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, 
intelligence gathering and advice to representatives of the Northern Alliance(38). In 
November 2001, Britain became the first NATO country to provide its special forces 
for Operation Enduring Freedom, but other countries soon followed suit. Particularly 
intensively the special forces of NATO member countries were used during 
Operation Anaconda in the mountains in the east of Afghanistan, as well as in other 
subsequent special operations. 
The third sphere, within which NATO can make a serious contribution to the 
international campaign against terrorism, is the exchange of intelligence information. 
The North Atlantic alliance has established communication channels for the exchange 
of intelligence between its members. The seriousness of NATO's assistance in this 
area can be judged, if only at the request of the United States on October 4, 2001, for 
assistance from its allies on a number of issues. It is not surprising that the 
strengthening of the exchange of intelligence data has become one of the Alliance's 
top priorities. After the events of September 11, a reconnaissance unit was set up at 
NATO Headquarters in Brussels to analyze the level of the terrorist threat. 
In addition, the exchange of intelligence information should not be limited to 
the member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Partnership 
Action Plan on Terrorism, signed by all EAPC members (26 NATO member 
countries and 20 partner countries) also includes provisions for improving the 
exchange of information. In addition, the alliance established the EAPC / PfP 
intelligence unit to facilitate the exchange of intelligence related to the terrorist 
threat(106). 
The NATO Partnership for Peace program provides good opportunities for 
creating a whole range of important anti-terrorism areas of cooperation. Established 
in 1994 to promote interaction between NATO members and countries of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, it was also a kind of "school" for those wishing 
to join the North Atlantic Alliance. Nevertheless, the nature and objectives of the 
Partnership have changed significantly over the past few years. For example, the ten 
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former members of the program are now full members of NATO, and the remaining 
partner countries can hardly expect to join in the near future. Thus, PfP can reorient 
its activities, which will not focus on preparing for full membership in NATO as 
before, but on developing cooperation in other areas. One of the possible directions 
for future cooperation can be precisely the fight against international terrorism. 
It is obvious that NATO can make a significant contribution to the fight against 
international terrorism by organizing and promoting cooperation in four interrelated 
spheres: diplomatic, military, intelligence exchange and defense cooperation. If, 
within the framework of the fight against terrorism, the main efforts are aimed at 
improving international cooperation in the four areas listed above, and especially on 
the development of the exchange of intelligence information, then NATO has the 
opportunity to make a significant contribution to the international campaign against 
terrorism. 
This became possible due to the fact that during the period of adaptation to the 
post-bipolar system of international relations, NATO was able to create such 
institutions as the EAPC, the Partnership for Peace, the Russia-NATO Council and 
the Mediterranean Dialogue. However, this does not mean that the North Atlantic 
alliance does not need a clearer design of its anti-terrorist activities. 
If NATO really wants to take an active part in the fight against transnational 
terrorism, it must first of all come to a common understanding among its member 
countries as a threat to transnational terrorism for the modern political system of the 
world and the necessary political strategy to combat it. Without this, the whole future 
fate of NATO's counter-terrorism activities will be questioned. It is also necessary to 
determine the further possible mission of the alliance, as well as the possibility and 
feasibility of conducting transactions involving her outside the area of her 
responsibility. Here, much will depend on the mission in Afghanistan, in the event of 
a successful outcome, which is also not obvious today, NATO will be able to claim a 
big role in the international anti-terrorist campaign. In addition, at the operational 
level of the fight against the terrorist method of the alliance, it is necessary to take 
three key changes(114).  
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First, as analysis of NATO's activity after the events of September 11 showed, 
it is necessary to implement a joint assessment of intelligence information in order to 
overcome the differences arising in the rupture of the threat-response ratio. Michael 
Herman believes that a joint assessment of intelligence information, according to the 
principle of the British Joint Intelligence Committee, can facilitate both the adoption 
of joint foreign policy decisions and coalition actions. Thus, the creation of such a 
mechanism within NATO will not only contribute to reducing the gap in the threat-
response ratio, but will also give an additional impetus to investment in the military 
sphere by the European member countries, which are so necessary for anti-terrorist 
operations.  
Secondly, the alliance needs to revise its strategic concept so that the campaign 
against terrorism clearly appears as one of the priorities of the alliance. It can also 
help to reduce the gap between the threat and the response to it, since the very 
revision of the concept itself will require a comprehensive discussion of the nature of 
the terrorist threat and may lead to a more concrete and shared conception by all 
NATO countries. Such a discussion can lead to the development of an improved 
overall strategy to combat terrorism, since new counterterrorist activities and new 
forms of fighting terrorism can emerge in the process of discussion.  
Thirdly, NATO must strengthen its capacity to conduct operations to maintain 
terrorism of the world. The North Atlantic alliance already has some experience in 
this area, however, much more needs to be done to develop opportunities to carry out 
such operations, which, in principle, can become an important contribution of the 
alliance in the fight against transnational terrorism. Nevertheless, most likely, 
NATO's participation in international antiterrorist cooperation will directly depend on 
Washington's choice of a strategy to combat terrorism. Here, of course, we are talking 
about a strategy to combat the terrorist method, since NATO does not yet understand: 
- the need to resolve and political problems of transnational terrorism. The US desire 
to act unilaterally led to the fact that NATO's anti-terrorist potential has so far 
remained, in fact, unclaimed. For Nicole Gnesotto, this serves as additional evidence 
that the North Atlantic alliance is simply unable to make a meaningful contribution to 
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the anti-terrorist struggle. If NATO wants to participate more actively in the 
international anti-terrorist campaign, then, first of all, it is necessary to enlist the 
support, including financial, of the US, since only they can give the North Atlantic 
Alliance a new impetus for active participation in the international campaign against 
terrorism. 
 
2.3. International Anti-Terrorist Coalition as an example of anti-terrorism 
activities outside the framework of intergovernmental organizations 
The International Antiterrorist Coalition, created after the events of September 
11, is comparable in scale and task to the anti-Hitler coalition of the Second World 
War. UNSCR 1373, adopted unanimously on September 28, 2001, calls on all UN 
member states to cease all terrorist activities, its support, and take all necessary steps 
to ensure that terrorists are brought to justice. This resolution became a fundamental 
element of modern multilateral anti-terrorism cooperation, as it gave states the 
necessary legal and political tools for it. One hundred and thirty-six countries offered 
the United States military assistance in one form or another, forty six international 
organizations expressed their support, one hundred and forty-two countries of the 
world froze funds that supposedly should have been used to finance terrorism. 
Eighty-nine countries gave the US permission to fly over its territory, and fifty-nine 
countries announced their readiness to quarter, if necessary, US military bases on its 
territory. In October 2002, military headquarters of the forty-two countries of the 
world were stationed at the headquarters of the Central Command of the US Armed 
Forces, coordinating the activities of their military departments with the Pentagon. 
This broad anti-terrorist coalition supported by many countries of the world has 
several characteristic features(5, p.157). First, the USA plays the leading role in it. 
Secondly, in addition to the struggle with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, this 
coalition was created to oppose the non-state actor, which is undoubtedly a new 
object for cooperation in modern history. Thirdly, the main goal of the coalition, at 
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least in the understanding of the United States, is both ambitious and somewhat 
ambiguous. First of all, we are talking about the total defeat of the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan, which, in principle, is a realistic task, even though it has not been fully 
implemented to date, and also to eradicate all types of international terrorism, which 
is most likely to be achieved in the foreseeable future term will not succeed. Fourthly, 
the coalition was formed spontaneously and is informal with no central governing 
bodies. Fifth, in its scope it surpasses most international organizations, with the 
possible exception of the UN and has a unique potential. Sixth, the military 
component, for all its importance, is not decisive, which distinguishes the modern 
anti-terrorist coalition from the classical military coalitions of the past. 
Since September 2001, American officials have repeatedly declared the 
formation of an "anti-terrorist coalition". This phrase, however, is deceptive, since 
there is no single coalition against terrorism. Rather, we can talk about the existence 
of a multitude of coalitions operating in different spheres. They were formed ad hoc 
and many countries are members of several coalitions. Bilateral relations with the 
United States are the main driving factor for participation in coalitions and not all 
members contact each other on anti-terrorism issues. Nora Benzahel, in particular, 
allocates a military coalition, a financial coalition, a law enforcement coalition, a 
coalition for the exchange of intelligence and a coalition for the restoration of failed 
states. Each of these coalitions has different goals and tasks, different number of 
members and each, in itself, has only a relative value. Together they form a complex, 
interconnected network, the so-called "coalition of coalitions" and their activities 
both contribute to and hinder the activities of other coalitions(4). Further, all five 
coalitions will be examined in detail, as well as their comparative analysis. 
The Military Coalition. Anti-terrorist efforts quite often require the armed 
forces to track down and destroy the alleged terrorist leaders. The military can also be 
used to deprive terrorists of shelters, as was clearly demonstrated during Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The most popular for the fight against terrorism 
will be special forces, acting secretly, i.e. without conducting large-scale operations 
that can give out their presence(5). 
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In the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to dominate the 
military antiterrorist coalition, since no country in the world has such opportunities to 
move and supply its armed forces across the globe as the US has today. Nevertheless, 
the remaining members of the coalition will also be able to make an important 
contribution to the military aspect of the fight against terrorism. 
First, a number of countries have highly efficient Special Forces, which can be 
used both separately and jointly with the American forces. For example, during the 
operation in Afghanistan, the Special Forces of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Turkey and the United Kingdom were actively used, 
which, under separate operations, were subordinated to the US military command. 
These units of different countries not only facilitated the fulfillment of tasks by the 
US Army, but also brought valuable experience during the operations. 
Secondly, in the event of the need to conduct simultaneous intensive anti-
terrorist operations in different parts of the world, the armed forces of the coalition 
members can, if necessary, replace American forces, thus releasing additional 
opportunities for the American army. 
Thirdly, coalition members can provide access to their bases, the right to fly 
through their territory to facilitate the conduct of anti-terrorist operations, as well as 
provide other military support. In some cases, to gain power support, the US and its 
allies can work with non-state actors, as it was with the Northern Alliance in 
Afghanistan(41). The use of local armed forces has the added advantage of better 
knowledge of the terrain and possible shelters for terrorists. Nevertheless, local armed 
forces can have their own interests, which run counter to the interests of the coalition 
members. It is precisely for the local forces not to pursue purely their own goals that 
the ground presence of a sufficient number of armed forces of the member countries 
of the coalition is necessary. 
Financial Coalition. The search for and destruction of financial networks of 
terrorists seems to be an important, but at the same time extremely difficult task. 
First, as American terrorist expert Paul Pillar points out, "terrorism is cheap." 
Explosions in the underground garage of the World Trade Center in New York in 
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1993 cost, presumably, only 400 US dollars, and the total cost of preparation and 
implementation of the September 11 attacks is estimated at between 500 and 600 
thousand US dollars (13). This is only a small part of those trillions of American 
dollars that pass through the world financial system every day. Such small amounts 
are very difficult to track and this task is further complicated by the fact that most of 
this money never gets into the international financial system at all. In the Arab world, 
for example, informal financial networks are popular, where money can be 
transferred anonymously without any unnecessary papers or using an assumed name. 
Financing of terrorism is also carried out through Islamic charitable organizations. 
Sometimes it is almost impossible to distinguish between funds that will go to 
support terrorism from those that really will be directed to charitable purposes. Thus, 
the financial coalition against terrorism is not stronger than its weakest link - those 
wishing to hide their financial transfers will aspire to those countries where there is 
no unnecessary paperwork and additional checks. 
Efforts to combat the financing of terrorism are characterized by rapid action 
and wide coverage. International cooperation in countering the financing of terrorism 
is more transparent than any other coalition, with the possible exception of a military 
coalition, and the countries and organizations involved in the process of interaction 
agree with a set of basic principles that should underpin their efforts. The measures 
taken have already brought a certain result: according to the data of the US Treasury, 
by April 2004, the financial coalition participants had frozen more than $ 200 million 
worth of funds, which supposedly were supposed to be used to finance terrorist 
activities. 
Despite obvious successes, there are a number of problems that call into 
question the long-term success of the coalition. First, not all measures are executed as 
quickly as they are accepted. Researches of the US government, independent research 
centers and the United Nations show that governments of some countries of the world 
do not fulfill their obligations, as a result of which terrorists still receive and send the 
necessary funds for their activities. Secondly, terrorists prefer to transfer funds 
through flexible and informal systems, which are difficult to track, for example, 
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through the well-known informal system of bank transfers "hawala" (in translation - 
trust). Thirdly, the states of the world have not yet come to a common opinion as to 
which groups are terrorist, which in turn leads to the fact that financial prohibitions 
on certain terrorist groups are applied in some countries, but in others there is not. 
This can lead to the fact that terrorists will keep their money in those countries where 
their activities are treated with condescension, which, of course, will practically bring 
to nothing all the efforts of other countries to find and freeze the funds sent to 
terrorist activities. Fourthly, even if it becomes possible to eliminate these 
divergences and contradictions, it will still be impossible to understand which of the 
measures taken were most effective in combating the financing of terrorism, since 
there is no basis for comparison. Unfortunately, there is no way by which it could be 
reliably established that the measures taken to block financing prevented all the 
terrorist acts planned by transnational terrorists, but the mere fact of freezing large 
sums of money shows that Al Qaeda still has at its disposal, enough financial 
resources are available for large-scale terrorist attacks(17, p.92). 
Because of all the above reasons, the financial coalition is likely to be the 
weakest of all antiterrorist coalitions. Efforts to find and freeze terrorists' funds are 
certainly important, but the means necessary for the terrorist act are so insignificant 
that terrorists, most likely, can easily assemble them, if necessary. 
Law Enforcement Coalition. Anti-terrorist efforts require effective cooperation 
between law enforcement agencies of the countries of the world. The events of 
September 11 showed that terrorists often crossed the borders of national states, being 
trained in. one country, planning attacks in another and carrying them out in the third. 
Democratic countries are especially vulnerable, since terrorists enjoy civil liberties 
that exist in democratic states in order to organize and plan their actions. A 
representative of the US administration noted that the terrorists who carried out the 
September 11 attacks deliberately chose Germany, Belgium and Great Britain for 
living, i.e. those countries where the liberal immigration system operates, the right to 
political asylum and other civil liberties(1). 
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International law enforcement cooperation makes an important contribution to 
the fight against terrorism, especially in the field of information exchange. 
Nevertheless, there are at least two important problems that can hamper effective 
cooperation in law enforcement. Firstly, many states cannot resolve the contradiction 
related to the fact that law enforcement agencies should both prevent terrorist acts 
and prosecute terrorists. Many countries decided to separate these two issues by 
creating an internal intelligence organization, whose responsibility is to prevent acts 
of terrorism, and entrusting law enforcement bodies with just prosecution. Secondly, 
different national standards also generate tension. Each country develops its standards 
on interrogation of suspects, on their content and on the procedures for prosecution. 
These standards, of course, vary and states will seek to avoid cooperation with those 
countries whose standards differ from those they have in the country. 
For example, EU member states do not transfer suspects to countries where 
they may face the death penalty, which, in particular, affects the EU-US anti-terrorist 
cooperation. The maintenance of terrorist suspects on the US military base 
Guantanamo in Cuba is also a controversial issue, since in many countries it is 
believed that the US is obliged to keep them as prisoners of war, otherwise they 
violate the Geneva Conventions and other provisions of international law. In addition, 
persons conducting interrogations in undemocratic countries can apply methods 
prohibited in democratic countries, including torture. Such differences in standards 
are part of state sovereignty, but they can seriously complicate efforts to identify, 
search and prosecute alleged terrorists. 
Coalition for the exchange of intelligence. The Coalition for the Exchange of 
Intelligence Information is perhaps one of the most important anti-terrorist coalitions. 
All coalitions seek to reduce the ability of terrorists to commit terrorist attacks, but 
convicted terrorists will find a way to obtain the necessary resources and find 
opportunities to commit a terrorist attack. The coalition for the exchange of 
intelligence data is the only one that can warn about the impending attack, which will 
allow countries to take preventive measures against persons wishing to carry out this 
attack. Nevertheless, the reluctance to disclose their sources of information has been 
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and remains an insurmountable problem. In addition, some countries are concerned 
that the information they provide can be accessed, both intentionally and accidentally, 
into untrustworthy hands. 
The creation of a multilateral intelligence exchange seems unlikely today, 
because of the above problems it can be considered an unrealistic goal. However, 
there is reason to believe that agreements on the exchange of intelligence information 
will be signed on a bilateral basis on a specific issue, and perhaps even on individual 
cases(77, p.234). 
Antiterrorist cooperation with foreign intelligence services will face the same 
risks as cooperation in the intelligence sphere on other issues. Some countries may 
not pay enough attention to persons who other states consider terrorists or potential 
terrorists. Persons conducting interrogations in different countries can ask different 
questions without receiving information that will be considered critical for other 
states. Foreign intelligence services may also be supported by supporters of terrorists 
who will transmit important information to them, including through international 
exchange.Despite all these problems, the coalition for the exchange of intelligence is 
key to preventing future terrorist attacks. The solution of these problems must be 
worked out on an individual basis between individual countries. 
Coalition for the restoration of failed states. As noted earlier, terrorists often 
base their activities on "uncontrolled territories" or in "failed states", which are 
characterized by instability of the situation (107). Instability results from a number of 
factors, including the inability of the central government to control part of its territory 
(such as in Indonesia and Colombia), the total absence of a central government (as it 
was in the Sudan and Somalia) and the consequences of the military confrontation (as 
it was in Afghanistan). Such uncontrolled territories provide terrorists with 
opportunities to set up training camps, search for recruits, and conduct their activities 
without fear of getting into the field of law enforcement. The presence of unstable 
regions allows terrorists to supply the population with necessary things and services 
that the government cannot or does not want to provide, thus expanding its support 
base and the circle of potential recruits. 
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The Recovery Coalition is more amorphous than the other coalitions described 
above, since it includes different actors engaged in different activities and in many 
parts of the world. These actions are not always coordinated, which leads, in some 
areas, to undesirable duplication and unintentional oversight in others. Contributions 
to the coalition may include the provision of armed forces for peacekeeping 
operations, the financing of various development projects, and the provision of 
technical expertise in certain areas. National states can make an important 
contribution, but it is in this coalition that non-state actors have even greater 
opportunities than states. Many international and non-governmental organizations 
have a significant potential for providing short-term humanitarian assistance, as well 
as long-term assistance in sustainable development. 
One of the main problems facing the recovery coalition is that, for success, it 
needs the commitment of long-term investment of resources, which is extremely 
difficult task even in the most favorable development of events. It is extremely 
difficult to transfer territories from the category of "unmanageable" to self-managed. 
Decisiveness on the part of states and international organizations may not be 
sufficient to overcome the problem of "uncontrolled territories", but it is obligatory 
for the efforts aimed at this to succeed(91, p.4). 
The five above-mentioned coalitions form a complex and interconnected 
network. Their actions are of a different nature, but, nevertheless, these coalitions 
remain interdependent. Their specific tasks can transform with time, as terrorist 
groups also evolve. Members of each coalition can also change due to the fact that 
new tasks may require opportunities that existing members do not have. Even if the 
coalitions will change, they will, of course, be closely related to each other. Many 
countries will be members of several coalitions, as their national interests in the fight 
against terrorism will inevitably affect the various functional areas described above. 
Thus, anti-terrorist coalitions form a dynamic and adaptive network, solving different 
issues with different members, but at the same time remain interconnected and 
interdependent. 
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III CHAPTER. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTITERRORIST VECTOR OF 
COOPERATION AS A BASIC DIRECTION OF SCO ACTIVITIES 
3.1. Formation of the SCO as a full-fledged regional organization and the main 
areas of cooperation within the SCO  
The history of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization began in 1996. On April 
26, 1996, the leaders of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in 
Shanghai to work out a unified position on the whole range of problems of regional 
cooperation, as well as to strengthen confidence-building measures in the military 
sphere. As a result of the forum, the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in 
the Military Region in the Joint Border Area was signed. 
In 1996-2000, the leaders of these countries (the "Shanghai Five") met 
alternately in Shanghai, Moscow, Alma-Ata, Bishkek and Dushanbe. The Dushanbe 
meeting in 2000 marked the end of the first round of meetings of the heads of state of 
the Shanghai Five. 
In 1996 and 1997, the SCO was formed on the basis of agreements on building 
confidence in the military sphere and on the mutual reduction of armed forces in the 
border area between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Russia and Tajikistan, 
respectively. 
At the meeting of the heads of the five states on June 15, 2001 in Shanghai, the 
leaders of the "Shanghai Five" accepted Uzbekistan into their ranks. On the same 
day, a declaration was signed on the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO).At the summit in St. Petersburg on June 7, 2002, the SCO 
Charter was adopted (entered into force on September 19, 2003) - the basic statutory 
document that fixes the goals, principles, structure and main directions of the 
Organization's activities. 
It includes eight member states: India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, 
Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The total territory of the SCO member 
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countries makes up 60% of the territory of Eurasia, the second part of the world 
population lives on it - 3 billion and 40 million people (122). The official working 
languages are Russian and Chinese. The headquarters of the organization is in 
Beijing. 
In addition to the member states of the organization, the SCO includes four 
observer states (Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran and Mongolia), three candidates to the 
observer states (Bangladesh, Egypt, Syria) and six states with the status of "partner 
for dialogue" (Azerbaijan, Armenia , Cambodia, Nepal, Turkey and Sri Lanka). 
Observer states include states that actively support the activities of the 
organization and aspire to become its full members. Mongolia became the first 
country to receive this status (at the summit in Tashkent in 2004) (96). The dialogue 
partner is a state that is not part of the region, but has the opportunity to participate in 
the summits of the organization. Previously, this status was granted to Sri Lanka and 
Belarus (at a summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009) (110). 
For a comprehensive assessment of the SCO as a regional organization, it is 
necessary to consider its basic documents - the Declaration on the Establishment of 
the SCO, signed in 2001 in Shanghai, and the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, adopted in 2002 in St. Petersburg (122). They proclaimed the main 
objectives of the organization: 
1) Strengthening mutual trust and good-neighborliness between participating 
countries; 
2) To assist countries in their effective cooperation in the political, trade, 
economic, scientific, technical and cultural fields, as well as in the fields of 
education, energy, transport, tourism, environmental protection; 
3) Joint provision and maintenance of peace, security and stability in the 
region; 
4) Advancement towards the creation of a democratic, just and rational new 
international political and economic order. 
Over the seventeen years of its existence, the SCO has become an effective 
platform for equal and mutually beneficial cooperation between participating 
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countries, united by common aspirations for peace and stability in the region. The 
SCO is not a closed alliance or a union of countries directed against other states and 
regions, but an open organization focused on broad international cooperation. 
The SCO region can not a priori be considered as always and in all things 
prosperous. It is characterized by instability, political, economic and social problems, 
as well as permanent interethnic contradictions. In view of this, political and 
economic stabilization in this region, along with solving other problems, is a priority 
task of the SCO, which requires an integrated approach to the development of the 
organization and concentration of efforts in several key areas of cooperation. 
Article 3 of the Charter of the SCO, adopted on June 7, 2002, declares 10 main 
areas of cooperation (123), but in practice the range of potential spheres of 
cooperation is much broader. At the same time, on a large range of issues, 
cooperation is only indicated in dotted lines or is only being declared, since in many 
areas there are difficulties with the practical implementation of activities. 
So, China, considering the SCO in the future as an economic integration union, 
offers a whole range of concrete projects aimed at expanding and strengthening trade 
and economic relations between the countries of the region. It should be noted that a 
significant part of them is deliberately hampered by the Ministry of Economic 
Development of the Russian Federation, since it sees in these initiatives a danger to 
the Russian market. 
The fact is that the mechanisms of interaction within the SCO framework in the 
economic sphere are still undeveloped and they often contradict one of the main goals 
of creating the SCO. In particular, the Charter states that economic interaction should 
lead to the creation of "favorable conditions for trade and investment with a view to 
the progressive realization of the free movement of goods, capital, services and 
technologies" (123), which essentially means development along the way of 
economic integration. 
Already at the first meeting of the leaders of the SCO member states on 
September 14, 2001 in Almaty, a Memorandum was signed between the governments 
of the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the main goals 
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and vectors of regional economic cooperation and the creation of favorable 
conditions in the sphere of trade and investment. Beginning in 2002, there were 
regular meetings of ministers responsible for the foreign economic and foreign trade 
activities of the organization. On September 23, 2003, the Council of Heads of 
Government (CHG) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) developed the 
"Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation Program", which outlined the main 
orientations and stages of interaction and economic integration for the period until 
2020. 
At the same time, joint working committees were formed: on electronic 
commerce, customs, technical procedures for assessing compliance, favoring 
investment, expanding transit potential, developing telecommunications technologies 
and fuel and energy complex. In 2004, in Bishkek, the SCO CHG adopted a plan of 
activities to implement this program, which included more than a hundred projects, 
spheres and areas of cooperation, and also provided mechanisms for their 
implementation. 
A key moment in the development of cooperation within the framework of the 
SCO was the agreement reached in 2005 in Moscow on the preparation of concepts 
for "pilot" projects in the field of hydropower, the creation of fiber-optic 
communications, cooperation in the scientific, technical and agricultural fields. In 
2006, the first "pilot" projects were launched in Dushanbe in such an important area 
as transportation, the question of developing the foundations of the functioning of the 
SCO Energy Club,more intensive interaction in the field of education and culture, 
expansion of ties in the spheres of health, tourism, development of youth contacts. 
At an official meeting on 2 November 2007 in Tashkent, at the initiative of the 
Russian side, it was proposed to take the necessary measures to revise the 
"Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation Program". In particular, the most 
promising projects were focused on specific areas of interaction - infrastructure 
construction, transport, energy, high technologies - and with the active participation 
of the Business Council and the Interbank Association of the SCO. 
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In this regard, the Special Working Group on Customs Cooperation prepared 
the Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters, signed in 
November 2007 (102). On October 30, 2008, in Astana, the heads of government 
signed the Protocol on the Exchange of Information on Control over the Movement 
of Energy Resources (73). Later, in 2009, the Protocol on Cooperation in the Field of 
Training and Advanced Training of Customs Officials was signed in Beijing (74). 
At the SCO Ministerial Meeting on Foreign Economic and Foreign Trade 
Sphere, on October 22, 2010 in Moscow, the parties once again stressed the need to 
accelerate the implementation of the action plan for the implementation of the 
program. According to Zhao Huizhun, the leading research associate of the Institute 
for the Study of Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia of the Academy of Social 
Sciences of China, the main task of economic interaction is "to realize the constant 
realization of goods, capital and free movement services and technologies until 2020 
"(39, p. 49). 
Trade relations between the SCO countries are gradually expanding, and the 
volume of trade is constantly increasing. According to the statistics of the Ministry of 
Commerce of China, compared to 2008, China's financial assistance to the SCO 
member states reached $ 960 million, having increased 26.3 times since 2003. 
Regarding the energy sector, in 2007 the Ministry of Energy of Russia 
developed and presented to the SCO partners a draft Regulation on the SCO Energy 
Club, and in 2011 the idea of creating such a discussion forum was translated into a 
practical plane. As expected, the club will be an open, partly formal, multilateral 
coordination mechanism in the energy sector with the participation of governments, 
energy companies, financial institutions and specialized scientific organizations. As 
necessary, the club will coordinate the interests of each of the parties through 
contacts and consultations, develop energy strategies, expand cooperation in all areas 
of infrastructure construction. 
In the sphere of finance, certain progress has also been made. Thus, at a 
meeting of the finance ministers and chairmen of the central banks of the SCO 
member countries in 2009. The need was stressed to accelerate the process of 
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agreeing the key principles for the functioning of the so-called SCO Special Account. 
In particular, the Russian position on this issue was based on the fact that the funds of 
the Special Account of the SCO should be designed for the conduct of feasibility 
studies of joint projects in various areas of cooperation, and can be allocated 
exclusively on the principle of urgency and credit repayment. The Chinese 
leadership, for its part, initiated the establishment of the SCO Development Bank. 
In general, it should be noted that in recent years, the trend towards 
intensification of economic activity within the SCO has increased significantly. At 
the next meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in November 2010 in 
Dushanbe, dedicated to the prospects of cooperation in the economic sphere, the 
initiative was supported by V.V. Putin on the revision of the plan for the 
implementation of the "Program of multilateral trade and economic cooperation of 
the SCO member countries until 2020" and the development of a "road map" in 
which prospective economic projects would be listed, specific deadlines for their 
implementation were indicated and the agencies responsible for it were identified. 
At the summit in Astana in June 2011, the leaders of the member states defined 
the vectors for the development of economic cooperation. In this connection, the final 
communique stressed that the priority course of the organization will always remain 
close interaction in the most important spheres of cooperation - such as security, 
economy and welfare of the population of the SCO countries. At the same time, one 
cannot but admit that economic cooperation within the SCO is the weakest sphere of 
activity of this organization. The realized multilateral economic projects, as a matter 
of fact, while are absent. The reports, as a rule, contain data on bilateral cooperation, 
implemented without the SCO. 
Obviously, the connection to the SCO of such large national economies as the 
Indian and Pakistani economies can greatly stimulate the development of economic 
cooperation within the organization, give impetus to the start of the implementation 
of a number of important multilateral projects. Both countries have significant 
potential in the economic, cultural, scientific and educational spheres and are able to 
seriously strengthen the organization's positions in the world arena. 
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Russia proposes to create a Development Fund (or a special account) as a 
mechanism for financing initial pre-design work, mainly in such key areas as energy, 
transportation, high technology. As expected, the practical implementation of projects 
will be controlled by the Interbank Association of the SCO. This approach is 
explained by the position of a number of Russian ministries, according to which, in 
the event of a bank having a significant financial opportunities, China will inevitably 
dominate it, while Russian interests are more in line with the activities created within 
the framework of the Eurasian Development Bank, where the Russian share far 
exceeds the contributions of other participants.It can be assumed that it is in Russia's 
interests to contribute to the creation of the SCO Development Bank, in whose active 
capital China and Russia would contribute equal shares (as in the SCO budget) and 
therefore have an equal number of votes. 
Cooperation in the field of security is a priority. The member countries of the 
organization signed the Convention against Terrorism (125), agreements on 
cooperation in the field of combating drugs and on cooperation in the fight against 
crime. A serious impulse to work together to combat illicit drug trafficking was given 
at the summit in Astana in June 2011, where a number of documents were adopted, in 
particular, the "SCO Antinarcotics Strategy for 2011-2016" and the Action Program 
for its implementation. Additional opportunities for active counteraction to the 
narcotic threat can be provided by cooperation between the SCO Secretariat and the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. In this connection, an appropriate 
Memorandum of Understanding was prepared, voiced and signed in Astana by the 
Secretary General of the SCO, M.S. Imanaliev and Deputy Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, Director of the UNODC Yu.V. Fedotov (126). 
Attention should be paid to the relationship of cultural interaction. For 17 
years, SCO member countries have actively participated in strengthening cooperation 
in the fields of culture, education, health, science, sports and tourism, signed a 
number of documents on cooperation, laying the social foundation for the 
development of the organization as a whole. 
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The SCO initially positioned itself as an organization striving to actively 
develop contacts in the humanitarian sphere. This is evidenced by its Charter, which 
states that cooperation in the humanitarian field isone of the priorities of this 
organization. However, its real implementation began only in 2005, after an expert 
group on cultural cooperation was established at the meeting of the Ministers of 
Culture to implement the "Plan for Multilateral Cultural Cooperation within the SCO 
for 2005-2006." 
Later, at the next meeting of the Ministers of Culture, the "Multilateral Cultural 
Cooperation Plan for 2007-2008" was adopted. During this period, humanitarian 
cooperation has really expanded and deepened. In addition, cooperation in the field of 
ecology is important. For example, in the vicinity of the Fergana Valley, radioactive 
waste burials are a big danger. Similar problems in the field of ecology are of concern 
to those states of the region that conduct their own activities in this direction. 
Kazakhstan is carrying out work to restore the Small Aral Sea, Uzbekistan - work to 
restore the ecosystem in order to secure mobile sands at the bottom of the exposed 
Aral Sea. 
Thus, humanitarian cooperation within the framework of the SCO is unfolding 
in all directions with varying degrees of intensity. It has become, as reflected in the 
Declaration of the Five-Year Plan of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, "one of 
the most important factors,guaranteeing the viability of the organization. The SCO 
can very well play the role of catalyst and an example for intercivilizational 
communication in the name of seeking solutions to problems that hamper the 
harmonization of relations in the world "(22). 
One of the most controversial aspects in the activities of the SCO is military 
cooperation. On the one hand, such cooperation is not among the main priorities of 
the Shanghai Organization. On the other hand, it is of great practical interest for all 
participating countries, primarily for Russia and China. However, in Russia, military 
contacts the vast post-Soviet space is more associated with the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO), which already has Collective Rapid Reaction Forces for 
these purposes. In China, military ties with Russia and the Central Asian republics at 
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the collective level are realized mainly with the use of the SCO potential.It is worth 
mentioning that there are no special structures involved in military planning and 
armed forces management within the SCO. To date, this is the prerogative of various 
consultations and meetings of the defense ministries and secretaries of security of the 
SCO countries. The practical side of such cooperation is the preparation and conduct 
of command post and tactical exercises, conducted at least once a year under the 
auspices of the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) of the SCO. 
In the PRC, such teachings are approached with great enthusiasm, which is not 
difficult to see if one follows their evolution. So, back in October 2002, China and 
Kyrgyzstan within the SCO implemented a plan for such exercises on a bilateral 
basis. In August 2003, in the territory of China, under the auspices of the SCO, the 
multilateral counterterrorism exercise "Interaction" was already held, and in 2005, 
within the framework of the SCO in Northeast China, the Russian-Chinese military 
exercise "Peace Mission 2005" was held. However, the 2005 exercise was not just the 
first bilateral exercise of the armed forces of Russia and the PRC, but it was first 
implemented with the extensive application of the naval component, to which the 
Chinese specialists showed great interest. 
Today, a new philosophy of development and integration within the SCO 
framework is obvious: the desire to create "decent living conditions for its citizens", 
the introduction of high social standards and the convergence of value guidelines. 
This requires the development of a joint socio-political and economic strategy for the 
modernization of the SCO member states, its filling with practical content and 
concrete projects on a bilateral and multilateral basis.The SCO was created as an 
organization to address border problems and security issues. Today, it is increasingly 
responsive to such contemporary challenges as globalization, the economic crisis, 
social instability, environmental problems. In the future, the SCO can become a real 
source and center of a "social and economic breakthrough" not only on a regional but 
also on a global scale. At the moment, the most important priority is the further social 
development of the SCO member states within the framework of a different speed 
movement towards regional integration. 
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3.2. The SCO strategy in the fight against terrorism, extremism and separatism 
The whole set of factors affecting the creation of tension in the states of 
Eastern Eurasia located in the SCO space, especially in Central Asia, can be 
conditionally grouped into three main: 
- The presence of separatist sentiments among large ethnic groups in a number 
of Eastern Eurasian states; 
- The desire of radical religious organizations to realize the idea of uniting 
some Muslim countries of Central and East Asia into large Islamic caliphates or other 
state entities with a Sharia form of government; 
- Insurgent speeches of certain forces fighting with existing regimes in 
individual countries. 
At the same time, in some states the basis for the activities of the above forces 
is a combination of different motives, but they are united by the growing use of 
extremist and even terrorist methods of achieving the goals. 
It should be specially emphasized that the activity of terrorist, extremist and 
separatist organizations in the SCO space is growing and, despite the measures taken 
to combat them, is building up the resource base. At the summit in June 2001 in 
Shanghai, the leaders of the six SCO member states were recognized as important not 
to delay with the introduction of the signed Convention on Combating Terrorism, 
Separatism and Extremism (115, p. 11). This document, containing agreed definitions 
of such complex international concepts and phenomena as terrorism, separatism and 
extremism, was aimed at practical cooperation of the participating countries in 
countering these negative and dangerous phenomena. It created good legal provisions 
for work on documents and other important and relevant areas of transnational anti-
criminal cooperation, such as the illegal traffic in drugs, weapons, ammunition, etc. 
The Convention provides for the establishment of the SCO Anti-Terrorist Structure, 
operating on an ongoing basis, with its headquarters in Bishkek (in 2004 it was 
moved to Tashkent) (115, p. 6). 
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Subsequently, the decisions of the St. Petersburg summit held in 2002 laid the 
foundation for the development of the main line of interaction between the SCO 
member states - the counteraction to international terrorism, religious extremism, 
national separatism (the so-called "Central Asian triangle" or "three evils", in Chinese 
terminology). In this regard, ensuring the readiness of countries to repel the terrorist 
threat has become one of the main tasks of the SCO participants. 
In October 2002, within the framework of the SCO, China and Kyrgyzstan 
jointly organized a bilateral antiterrorist military exercise. Beginning in August 2003, 
when the maneuvers "Interaction-2003" were held for the first time (in October 2009, 
the seventh exercises were held), the SCO countries almost every year conduct joint 
military exercises within the framework of the program to combat terrorism in 
Central Asia. At the military maneuvers "Interaction - 2009", which were held for the 
first time within the framework of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) of 
CSTO of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the SCO member 
countries (except China) worked through crisis situations in cooperation with other 
participants wider coalition. In 2005, Russia and China held the Peace Mission 2005 
in the territory of the PRC (10,000 servicemen of the two countries, including about 
2,000 Russian, took part in them), and in 2004-2005, also a series of Russian-Indian 
(India had observer status in the SCO) land and naval military maneuvers. In July 
2007, military exercises of all participants of the SCO "Peace Mission - 2007" were 
conducted on the territory of Russia (on the testing ground near Chebarkul) (115, p. 
73). 
During the summit in Tashkent in June 2004, the official opening ceremony of 
the Executive Committee of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), which is 
based in Tashkent (the executive committee started functioning in January 2004), was 
signed, and an agreement was signed between the SCO member states on cooperation 
in combating illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their 
precursors (52, p. 193-194). 
The PRC was the depositary of the agreement on the Regional Anti-terrorist 
Structure, which indicated the important role of China in organizing this activity. The 
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RATS is the SCO body, designed to facilitate coordination and interaction of the 
competent bodies of the parties in the fight against terrorism, separatism and 
extremism. The main tasks and functions of the RATS are the development of 
proposals on combating terrorism, the assistance to competent authorities, the 
collection and analysis of information, the formation of a database on individuals and 
organizations that support terrorism, separatism and extremism, assistance in the 
preparation and conduct of operational search and other activities for combating these 
phenomena, maintaining contacts with international organizations (103, p. 41). 
The SCO, developing its own approaches to the organization of the fight 
against terrorism, adheres to the principle of external openness, is ready to conduct a 
dialogue, exchange and cooperation with other countries and international 
organizations. In November 2002, at a meeting of the SCO foreign ministers, the 
SCO's Temporary Scheme for External Relations was adopted, according to which 
the SCO has the right to invite representatives of other countries and international 
organizations as a guest to a meeting of foreign ministers and consultations on 
foreign policy issues, and to send their representatives to participate in the events of 
other international organizations. 
Already in 2003, official external contacts of the SCO on antiterrorist issues 
with various international organizations were initiated. Representatives of the SCO 
attended that year at a special meeting of the UN Security Council's Anti-Terrorism 
Commission (March 2003, New York), at the OSCE Dialogue Partners' Meeting 
(April 2003, Vienna), at the fifth UN High Level Meeting and Regional 
Organizations (July 2003 New York), at the OSCE Conference on Combating and 
Preventing Terrorism (September 2003, Lisbon). 
The new model of the security concept found by the "Shanghai Five" is the 
maximum reduction of armed forces and military activities in the border zone on the 
basis of mutual trust, through dialogue and consultations, strengthening transparency 
and strengthening friendly contacts, creating borders for good-neighborliness and 
friendship, and regional security on the basis of stimulating the relationship of 
cooperation - has been further developed. 
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We can now say that within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, it has been possible to basically remove the problem of tension on the 
borders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia and China from the Pamirs to 
the shores of the Pacific Ocean; first of all, to create a system of confidence-building 
measures, first of all, in the military sphere, to think through and debug the system of 
combating manifestations of terrorism and extremism, to a large extent using 
measures to prevent these phenomena or stop them at an early stage, to create a 
forum for constant discussion and development of relations. 
The content of the Organization's activities has come a long way - from 
resolving issues of a territorial and military nature to multi-disciplinary discussion, 
consultations and concerted concrete measures on a wide range of issues, including 
international terrorism, extremism and separatism, drug trafficking and other threats 
to regional stability and security. The fulfillment of plans and programs adopted by 
the SCO serves the development of the economy, raising the living standards of the 
population of the region and strengthening the security of the CAR states. The 
effectiveness of the multilateral structures created to combat terrorism, extremism, 
separatism, drug trafficking and other manifestations of cross-border crime is 
increasing. This model of a new type of security is united in spirit with five principles 
of peaceful coexistence and other generally accepted norms of international relations. 
"In recent years," said I. Zvyagelskaya, an expert at the Information and 
Analytical Center for Studying Social and Political Processes in the Post-Soviet 
Territory, "the hierarchy of security challenges in Eastern Eurasia has been quite 
clearly defined. They can be divided into two groups. The first includes those threats 
and challenges that are not so much intra-regional as the external nature. These 
include drug trafficking, arms smuggling, the activities of extremist groups using 
terrorist methods and receiving support from abroad. All these threats belong to a 
non-traditional series, but, judging by everything, they will dominate the future in the 
system of international relations in and around Central Asia. 
The second group, fraught with instability, is the disproportion in the economy, 
the increase in social inequality against the backdrop of increasing corruption, the 
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problems of water scarcity and the reduction in some areas of land suitable for 
agriculture, poverty. Many of the above security challenges are not at all diseases of 
the Central Asian states. According to experts, they are typical for other post-Soviet 
republics, including Russia, where the problems of corruption and social inequality 
are quite acute. The socio-political group of reasons capable of causing instability 
creates opportunities for mobilizing the population of various kinds of radical groups 
"(103, p. 196). 
Of course, the expert believes, in different countries the situation looks 
different, but the prospects for internal destabilization to some extent exist 
everywhere. At the same time, negative external impact can be productive in 
conditions when a very significant potential for dissatisfaction has been created in a 
particular state; there are forces that are relatively easy to mobilize. That is why there 
are reasons to believe that the internal security challenges in Central Asia play a 
greater role at this stage than external ones (103, p. 196). 
The new geopolitical role of the SCO is largely determined by the Islamic 
factor, which has a significant impact on the situation both in the region and in 
Eurasia as a whole. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of new 
independent states in this region, as in other parts of Eurasia, an intensive process of 
revival of Islam began, while maintaining the secular nature of state power, 
preventing the politicization of religion and trying to bring elements of democracy 
and liberalism into public relations. 
During the transit period, the countries of Central Asia, as well as to some 
extent Russia and China, faced a number of similar political problems related to the 
stability of their societies and the elites' ability to ensure the peaceful development of 
their states. The historical traditions and mentality of the peoples hamper the 
development of democratic principles. There is also a deep distrust of the so-called 
Western democracy, especially in the variants implanted in the SCO space and in 
other regions by the United States. 
Of course, democracy is not a panacea for the emergence of people in leading 
positions who are not very suitable for fulfilling the mission of leaders for the whole 
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people. But no less dangerous is the underestimation of the importance of developing 
democratic institutions (certainly taking into account the specifics of each country), 
capable of rectifying the situation evolutionarily. 
That is why in scientific circles and in the political sphere there is a search for 
optimal options for the progressive development of social relations. In Russia and 
Kazakhstan, for example, the terms "sovereign democracy" and "managed 
democracy" have come into use, which reflect the fears of the ruling regimes that the 
struggle for democracy and the power struggle will eventually turn into one and the 
same. 
On the one hand, such terminology can be seen as a reflection of the degree of 
development of democratic processes in society, and, on the other hand, as an 
understanding by the elite that it is in this form of democracy, in its manageability 
and protection from destructive influence from outside, that, in the opinion of the 
majority of the population, guarantee of preventing political upheavals, which at this 
stage is more important for him than uncontrollable and unprotected by state 
instruments freedom. 
This is all the more important because a number of rigidly structured radical 
organizations and movements operate in the states of Central Asia, among which 
currently the most serious position is taken by such a radical movement as Hizb ul-
Tahrir al Islami (HTI). HTI is opposed to the very idea of secular power, which in 
accordance with its postulates everywhere should replace the caliphate, opposes 
market relations, democracy, tolerance, dialogue of cultures. At first, HTI was limited 
to the distribution of leaflets and printed publications, propaganda and mobilization 
activities. Later, especially after the explosions in Tashkent in 2004, the transition to 
terrorist methods became evident. The key to the influence of the Tahrists is the 
patronage networks they have created. The habitual dependence on the community, 
the clan, the family, and the system of loyalty built along these lines, sometimes 
holds the adherents of Islamism no less firmly than the actual ideological content of 
the activities of the Tahrists. 
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At the same time, Islamists do not recognize national isolation, they do not 
need customs, borders, strong governments. People who are tired of the confrontation 
of clans, the rupture due to the emergence of state borders of ties with relatives and 
friends, deprived of the usual occupations, can perceive the slogan of a single Muslim 
space as a desirable alternative. 
 "Any social and political protest in the conditions of a traditional society," 
Zvyagelskaya believes, "can easily saddle forces that have nothing to do with 
democracy, which under the slogans of social justice can sweep away the emerging 
liberal institutions by choosing the path of eastern despotism. This will mean 
overturning the region in the past, the link between Central Asia and the gray zone in 
Afghanistan, the choice of new geopolitical landmarks, etc. "(103, p. 201). 
In the current situation, Afghanistan is the most problematic country - the 
source of one of the most significant threats to stability in the Central Asian region. 
Formed here after the "overthrow" of the Taliban regime by NATO, the provisional 
Afghan administration only partially fulfilled its tasks - under the guidance of US 
advisers and with the support of NATO troops it ensured the adoption of a new state 
constitution, the holding of elections and the re-election of the president of the 
country, the formation of the government, political arena "Taliban" as an influential 
force, neither in the country, nor in the region as a whole could not. Full control of 
Kabul situation throughout the country, even with the help of NATO forces, after 
almost a decade has not been established. 
The leaders of ethnic clans, as well as field commanders, retain their 
independence in different parts of Afghanistan and determine the situation in the 
country more than the central government and "peacekeepers". Thus, the main tasks - 
the destruction of Al-Qaeda and the defeat of the Taliban - were unresolved. On the 
contrary, both organizations quickly regained their strength after striking them in 
2001 and 2002. Moreover, the Taliban are building up resistance and are switching 
from separate diversionary attacks to conducting whole operations. A serious danger 
is the "Talibanization" of Pakistan. It is known that the headquarters of Al-Qaeda is 
in the north of Pakistan, in Waziristan, which in early 2007 the Taliban was declared 
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a "free Islamic territory" and announced the establishment of a new Islamic state 
there. 
The military political formations of the Taliban and al-Qaeda on the border 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan have turned into centers of Islamist terrorism. In 
2007, the Taliban adopted a tactic of Shaheed movements. Attempt on February 27, 
2007. US Vice President R. Cheney in Kabul, for example, was executed using an 
Afghan shahid. The return of control by the Taliban over much of southern 
Afghanistan could lead to the fall of the existing regime in Pakistan, which proved 
unable to prevent the proclamation of a non-controlled Islamic state on part of its 
territory. And this is fraught with the transition of Pakistan with its nuclear arsenal to 
the control of radical Islamists. The presence in Pakistan of nuclear weapons 
combined with the unpredictability of its political development and direct 
involvement in the Afghan problem poses a security threat that extends far beyond 
the Central Asian region. 
In the context of broader contacts of the region's population with the 
inhabitants of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the militants operating in them, radical 
ideas can give impetus to the growth of local radicalism, the emergence and 
strengthening of extremist groups. For Central Asian republics with a predominantly 
Muslim population, the problem of counteracting the ideology of religious fanaticism 
and extremism, which captures and poisons the consciousness of the younger 
generation in the first place, turns it into an obedient tool in the hands of various 
terrorist groups and movements. 
A special place in the activities of the SCO is the fight against the increase in 
drug trafficking in Central Asia and through it. It should be noted that after the fall of 
the Taliban power in Afghanistan in 2001, the flow of drugs only increased. In 2002, 
the SCO recognized the useful creation of an anti-drug security system along the 
perimeter of Afghanistan's borders. However, it was not possible to create a 
sufficiently harmonious international system of drug control. Therefore, in 2004, 
within the framework of the SCO, an Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Illicit 
Drug Trafficking was signed. 
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Experts estimate that more than 90% of opium entering the world drug market 
is exported from Afghanistan. Despite military operations, opium poppy is grown in 
Afghanistan in areas over 190,000 hectares, including in areas controlled by NATO 
troops. According to the Russian Federation State Drug Control Service, there are 
about 50 laboratories producing heroin in Afghanistan, with a capacity of about 30 kg 
per day. Most of them are located in remote mountain areas. Among them there are 
even mobile. They work well-trained chemists, who are often representatives of 
other, including European, states. The supply of these laboratories with raw materials 
and the organization of export of finished products are established quite clearly. 
According to the UN report, almost half of the drug production falls on 2 of the 33 
Afghan provinces - Nangarhar and Helmand, exactly where the American and British 
troops are located (92, p. 119-121). 
The measures taken in Afghanistan to combat drug trafficking are clearly not 
enough. The flow of drugs from there is increasing. According to UN estimates, 
drugs now go in three main directions. The first by their volume is the so-called 
western route - Iran, Turkey and the Balkans (40% of drugs produced in the country). 
The second place belongs to the southern - Pakistani direction (36%). The third route 
is the northern route - the states of Central Asia, China and Russia (24%) (92, p. 121-
122). 
There are still differences in the Russian and Western approaches to the 
strategy of combating the Afghan drug expansion. The West believed that this 
struggle should be fought, first of all, in Afghanistan itself by strengthening the 
central government, its law enforcement bodies and the restoration of normal 
agriculture. Its representatives also urge Moscow to use its special relations with the 
Northern Alliance and send Afghan drug policemen trained in Russia to its zone to 
step up work in this direction in the north of the country. 
Russia, more deeply assessing the state of affairs in Afghanistan, offers a way 
to create around it "belts" that block the path of drug trafficking. At that, the first 
"shielding belt" should be continuous and located along the borders of Afghanistan, 
and the second - to become such a "belt" on the Russian-Kazakh border and the 
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Caspian, on the Indo-Pakistani, Iranian-Turkish borders and in some other places. 
This opinion was repeatedly expressed at various special conferences on this issue 
(92, p. 123). 
However, it is possible to achieve an effect in this matter only by concerted and 
integrated use of all available means in the fight against drug trafficking. It is 
necessary to intensify the implementation of activities for which the West is acting, 
reinforcing them by harsh NATO control of the identified internal Afghan transport 
corridors for the movement of drugs through the installation of specialized 
checkpoints at their nodes and regular raids on the destruction of heroin laboratories 
and poppy fields. Unquestionably, it will be necessary to create the "belts of barriers" 
offered by Russia. 
Of course, all this will require considerable costs, but because in this case, 
cooperation of all interested states, including European ones, is needed. To some 
extent, they will require the recruitment of military contingents of the countries 
concerned, as well as the use of operational data of their security agencies possessing 
information on places of production and storage, routes and methods of 
transportation, wholesale distribution and retail sale of Afghan drugs. And most 
importantly, the implementation of such plans should be carried out under a single, 
systematic and effective international management and control, for example, the 
Department of Drugs and the Fight against Organized Crime of the United Nations. 
This is the only way to avoid or reduce the subjectivity of some states in this matter, 
as well as to prevent the emergence and rooting of corruption, both among personnel 
and in its governing bodies in the countries concerned (60, p.58). 
In connection with this at the current stage, the fight against drug trafficking 
remains one of the SCO's top priorities. In general, Afghanistan today retains many 
contradictions that directly affect the situation in the countries of the region, which 
require long-term creative work to overcome. One of the real ways to give it a 
positive impetus can and should be the activation of the activities of the SCO contact 
group and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 
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3.3. The place of the SCO in the multilateral cooperation in fighting against 
transnational terrorism 
There are a large number of common threats, such as transnational terrorism or 
drug trafficking, which require the cooperation of all countries and organizations of 
the modern world. These common threats are on the agenda of all major regional 
structures, including the SCO, CSTO and NATO. In fact, all regional organizations 
have overlapping tasks related to these threats. Therefore, we can say that there is 
definitely room for cooperation, but the question arises whether these regional 
organizations can build a successful dialogue with each other? 
There are some attempts by these regional institutions to develop contacts with 
other regional organizations. On April 21, 2005, the ASEAN Secretariat signed the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Secretariat of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO). ASEAN and the SCO Secretariats intend to focus 
on the priority area of combating international crime, which includes terrorism, drug 
control, arms smuggling, money laundering and human trafficking. Other areas of 
cooperation are economics and finance, tourism, the environment and the 
management of natural resources, social development and energy (124). 
In October 2007, the CSTO signed an agreement with the SCO in the capital of 
Tajikistan, Dushanbe, in order to expand cooperation on security issues, organized 
crime and illicit drug trafficking(122). 
Despite the often denied military nature of the SCO, as well as the differences 
between its members in the armed forces and the degree of their cooperation on 
security issues, five recent events indicate that the SCO is developing into a more 
mature security organization: 
- First, military and political functions were combined. For the first time the 
meeting of political leaders at the highest level (Bishkek 2007) coincided with the 
conduct of military exercises (Peace Mission of the SCO 2007). Prior to this, high-
ranking officials who observed military exercises 
 
 
72 
 
SCO, there were only ministers of defense. The heads of state attended the 
military exercises for the first time in the history of the SCO and had to demonstrate 
the growing importance of military cooperation in the SCO, as well as signaling their 
determination to jointly monitor the security situation in the region; 
- Secondly, a change in attitude towards the concept of military assistance. 
Perhaps the most significant transformation in the field of security policy was the 
scenario of the Peace Mission 2007 exercises, in which military assistance played a 
central role. One of the vital components of a full-fledged security organization, to 
which the CSTO also belongs, is military mutual assistance. Although it is now 
impossible to note any signs that such an article will be included in the SCO political 
documents, the scenario of the "Peace Mission-2007" nevertheless demonstrated the 
actual application of the concept of military assistance; 
- Thirdly, since 2002, the SCO military exercises have become more and more 
ambitious, having passed in their development the path from bilateral or multilateral 
formats to a united one involving all the members of the SCO. At the same time, this 
format concerned not only the fight against terrorism, but also the issues of ensuring 
external security. In addition, even before the Bishkek summit, on June 27, 2007, the 
SCO defense ministers reached an agreement on joint maneuvers. According to 
Kyrgyz Defense Minister Ismail Isakov, this agreement will become a long-term 
organizational and legal basis for such actions in the future; 
- Fourthly, the Shanghai Summit of 2006 confirmed that in case of a threat to 
peace in the region, as well as stability and security, the SCO members are entitled to 
hold immediate joint consultations in order to find the most effective response to this 
or that emergency situation. In addition, the intention was expressed to develop a 
mechanism for responding to threats to regional peace, as well as to explore the 
establishment of a regional mechanism for conflict prevention within the SCO itself. 
The desire to continue work on creating security mechanisms, similar to what can be 
found in NATO, was reiterated during the Bishkek summit in 2007(21).  
The basic documents of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization show that the 
fundamental interests of its member countries are aimed at uniting efforts in 
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maintaining stability in the region through the creation of a reliable system of 
regional security. 
- The SCO intends, firstly, to confront the long-term threat of the spread of 
extremism and terrorism in Central Asia. This threat in many cases takes on an 
Islamist tinge and, as experience shows, is able to have a serious impact on the 
radicalization of public consciousness in the countries of the region that are affected 
by conflict zones in neighboring states. 
- Secondly, a number of urgent tasks to ensure both regional and national 
security of each SCO state include the issue of taking tough measures to combat drug 
trafficking. Central Asia is actually at the crossroads of world drug trafficking routes, 
which also contributes to the illegal sale of weapons, which is done by emissaries of 
Islamist terrorist organizations. 
- Thirdly, the SCO is developing a strategy and tactics to study and develop 
measures to create an atmosphere of stability in conflict situations that arise in 
Central Asia and are caused "mainly by the competition of world forces for influence 
in the region” (53). 
Representatives of such international structures as the UN, the EU, the CSTO, 
the SCO, NATO, etc. are active in Central Asia, which partly fulfill the functions of 
developing regional security measures. It is quite difficult to appreciate their efforts 
in this field positively, not only because their effectiveness is affected by disunity and 
inconsistency caused by political, ideological and economic disagreements. Each of 
these structures is distinguished by its own approach to solving essentially the same 
problems, which is explained by the goals laid down by the founders when creating 
the appropriate unions and associations. NATO is a military-political organization, 
the goal is the protection of freedom and democracy. The main objectives declared by 
the EU are: the introduction of European citizenship; ensuring freedom, security and 
the rule of law; promoting economic and social progress; strengthening the role of 
Europe in the world. The SCO stated that its goals are to strengthen mutual trust and 
good-neighborliness between participating countries; assistance to their effective 
cooperation in political, trade-economic, scientific-technical and cultural spheres; 
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joint provision and maintenance of peace, security and stability in the region; 
promotion to the creation of a democratic, just and rational new international political 
and economic order. 
If we proceed from the contents of the documents of each structure, it seems 
that any of them is an example of selfless service to the noblest goals. This is - at first 
glance. In fact, NATO, led by the United States of America, first, prefers a 
paramilitary approach to solving problems (primarily their own). Secondly, the 
overwhelming majority of the EU member states are simultaneously members of 
NATO. And although Europe is located at a fairly considerable distance from Central 
Asia, it does not serve as an obstacle for the members of the Alliance to transfer their 
military contingents to places where, according to his leadership, there is a threat to 
Western democracy. 
Washington covers its interests in Central Asia very attractively, formulating 
them as a permanent support for democratic institutions, local NGOs and independent 
media. However, the latest developments show that the measures for 
"democratization" are increasingly combined with the unceremonious expansion of a 
diverse American presence. In fact, it is the practice of improving the methods of 
establishing world domination, implemented by the integrated planning of the 
military-political and economic strategy and implemented with the help of all kinds 
of "non-governmental organizations". 
Despite the significant changes taking place in our rapidly transforming world, 
NATO leadership is still convinced (and trying to convince others) that the Alliance 
is non-alternative in world politics, that only it is an effective tool for introducing 
"democratic values" far beyond its zone responsibility, in particular in Central Asia. 
The implementation of such unipolar views is fraught with unpredictable 
consequences. 
The high activity of the United States and NATO in the region also aims to 
consolidate its military presence, which is facilitated by numerous programs and 
agreements in bilateral and multilateral formats designed to "tie" the states of the 
region to the policy of the Alliance, which seeks to control their transport and transit 
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potential. The issue of the possibility of using NATO as an instrument of energy 
security is being urged. 
The researchers note that the presence of NATO armed forces in Central Asia 
can also be considered as a kind of base for controlling the neighboring countries 
(88), allegedly representing a certain danger to the interests of the West. There is an 
obvious desire for NATO to become a key geopolitical and military player in Central 
Asia using the already established framework (the mechanism of cooperation through 
the Partnership for Peace program, the legal framework for relations with the Central 
Asian countries, and military-political interaction). 
The SCO does not declare itself (and is not) a military-political organization. It 
also does not include "sins" in the sense of "promoting democracy" through military 
intervention in the internal affairs of other states (as opposed to NATO). At the 
initiative of the US, the alliance's armies have been taking part in the campaign to 
plant a "new world order" with weapons in Afghanistan and Iraq for the past almost 
16 years under the pretext of fighting terrorism. 
In general, since the formation of the Shanghai Five, five states included in the 
Shanghai Five managed to achieve the following: 
- agreed on the boundary problems, concluded the "Agreement on 
strengthening confidence in the military area in the border area" (1996) (99), which is 
known as the "Shanghai Declaration" and the "Agreement on mutual reduction of 
armed forces in the border area", signed on the second meeting of the Shanghai Five 
in Moscow (1997) (100). These agreements have raised the level of trust between the 
five participating countries, increased the level of cooperation between the border 
services, established mutual control over the border zone, and the countries agreed to 
inform each other about the situation at the borders. Having solved the problems with 
China, it is not yet possible to consolidate by signing the corresponding agreement on 
the junction point of the three Central Asian countries: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan; 
- The following structures have been established in the SCO structure for 
coordination of efforts in the sphere of security and development: Meeting of heads 
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of law enforcement agencies, border agencies, defense ministers, foreign ministers, 
ministers for emergency situations; 
- The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and 
Extremism was signed (2001) (104); 
- The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) of the SCO with the Executive 
Committee in Tashkent, Uzbekistan was created and started working. In the RATS 
SCO, a mechanism has been set up for meetings of secretaries of the Security 
Councils of member states; 
- A contact group "SCO - Afghanistan" has been established which is another 
important historic step in maintaining peace and stability in the region "; 
- Also on issues of security and development, contacts have been established 
with such international structures as, with the UN Security Council and with the UN 
Committee on Combating Terrorism, the OSCE, the CIS Antiterrorist Center (ATC); 
- An agreement on cooperation in combating the illicit trafficking in narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances was signed. 
Thus, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has created a set of mechanisms 
and arrangements capable of regulating the security processes in the region. Putting 
in the head - the fight against the "three forces of evil" the organization began to take 
shape in a structural and legal manner. First, in 2001 the Convention on Combating 
Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism was signed. There were clear definitions of the 
relevant terms (104). 
In June 2002, at the summit in St. Petersburg, an Agreement was signed 
between the SCO member states on the Regional Antiterrorist Structure. The 
Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is designed to facilitate coordination and 
interaction of the competent bodies of the SCO parties in the fight against terrorism, 
separatism and extremism. The RATS is a permanent body of the SCO with its 
headquarters in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. If necessary, the Council of Heads of State of 
the SCO member states may establish RATS offices in the territory of any of the 
member countries. Financing of this organization is carried out from the means of the 
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SCO budget and today it is about 1 million US dollars. The RATS Council includes 
30 people, including seven from Russia. 
The main objectives of the RATS are the development of proposals and 
recommendations on the development of cooperation in the fight against terrorism, as 
well as the assistance of member states in combating new threats. RATS will also 
collect, analyze information and form a databank for international terrorist and 
extremist organizations, their leaders, structures and individuals involved in these 
organizations. In addition, the RATS is expected to analyze the status and trends of 
the spread of terrorism and extremism, as well as gather information on non-
governmental organizations and individuals supporting terrorists(101). 
Work is also underway to create a "List of terrorist, separatist and extremist 
organizations whose activities are prohibited in the territories of the SCO member 
states." At the same time, there is no common understanding of which organizations 
are considered terrorist and which threaten national security. The final formulation of 
single (common) lists of terrorist and extremist organizations is hampered by national 
differences. Thus, the activities of the Islamic Party of Turkestan and the 
Organization for the Liberation of Eastern Turkestan are banned in 3 states, Al Qaeda 
and the Taliban of Afghanistan - 4, and the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan, the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan "And" Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami "- in five (39). 
According to the Director of the RATS V. Kasymov: "The RATS is an 
international organization with diplomatic status, which consists of two bodies - the 
executive committee and the council of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, which 
meets twice a year and determines strategic directions of activities and planned 
events" (68). 
For the executive committee of the RATS three directions are defined: 
information and analytical support of the activities of the competent bodies of the 
parties; coordination of activities to combat terrorism, extremism and separatism, as 
well as international legal activities. In information and analytical activities, the main 
task is to create a unified databank for international terrorist organizations and their 
members. To date, the RATS executive committee has fulfilled the mandate of the 
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heads of state to create a list of terrorist organizations and persons involved in the 
commission of terrorist acts and who participated in the preparation of these 
crimes(68). 
It is important to note that the RATS is not an analog of Interpol, but a 
coordinating body designed to ensure the interaction of the competent bodies and 
services of the six countries. 
As the Permanent Representative of Russia at the SCO Secretariat G. Logvinov 
believes: "you cannot immediately expect that the RATS will start working with full 
measure now. The problem is that the documents signed with regard to the RATS 
must still be ratified, and the procedure for transferring confidential information to 
the international bodies should be worked out”(37).  
The RATS has a work plan for the coming years (approved at the last meeting 
of the RATS Council), as the Cooperation Program of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization member states in the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism 
for 2007-2009 was approved at the sixth meeting of the RATS in March 2006. In 
addition, in order to strengthen cooperation in the field of security and to improve the 
effectiveness of the fight against terrorism, separatism, extremism and protection of 
the common interests of the SCO states, it was considered appropriate to continue 
joint anti-terrorist exercises with the participation of law enforcement bodies and 
special services aimed at strengthening coordination in the fight against the 
abovementioned threats. Such exercises have been held regularly since August 2003. 
Last exercises "East-antiterror-2006" were held in March 2006 on the territory of 
Uzbekistan (114). Special units, law enforcement agencies and other law enforcement 
agencies were involved in the exercises. As noted in the RATS SCO "The basis for 
the plan of the exercises was the task of working out the actions to find and neutralize 
the terrorists who are carrying out plans for preparing and committing large-scale 
terrorist actions on important state facilities with a view to destabilizing the political 
and social situation in the Central Asian states” (116). 
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Obviously, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, from the first days of its 
existence, began to fulfill its duties systematically and effectively to implement the 
principle "Russia, China and Central Asia - a zone free from terror"(97).  
The previously mentioned directions, goals and tasks of the Eurasian 
integration cooperation of the SCO member states in ensuring interaction and 
compromise of the interests of the economy, politics, defense, security were 
considered at the SCO summit in Astana on June 9, 2017. 
In the speech at the SCO Summit in 2017, in Astana, the President of the 
Russian Federation, V.V. Putin defined the strategic tasks of the SCO in the field of 
regional and international security. He stressed that the priority for the SCO has 
always been and is to ensure security and stability on the external borders of member 
states by honest and constructive unification of the efforts of all countries on the basis 
of strict observance of international law(85). 
Also, Vladimir Putin noted that along with eliminating the social and economic 
causes that give rise to terrorism, it is necessary to do everything to neutralize the 
ideology of terrorism with the increasing role of the SCO Regional Antiterrorist 
Structure. With the mediation of Russia, Turkey and Iran, a series of regular 
international meetings were held in Astana to work out agreements on a cease-fire 
between Syrian government troops and the armed opposition. This was a real chance 
to give impetus to the inter-Syrian negotiation process in Geneva. The key to 
ensuring regional stability is the state of affairs in Afghanistan, which could be 
facilitated by the restoration of the activity of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group 
suspended in 2009 (85). 
The ideas of the International Cooperation Forum "One Belt - One Way" will 
be gradually realized in Beijing on May 14-15, 2017, including by coordinating 
international, regional and national projects focused on cooperation for sustainable 
development based on the principles of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit. 
President of Russia V.V. Putin stressed the importance of uniting the potentials of the 
EEMP, the SCO, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the China One-Way 
One Way initiative to link integration projects in Eurasia, positively assessing in this 
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context the decisions taken at the summit, especially the accession of India and 
Pakistan to SCO. 
In conclusion, I want to say that the SCO's antiterrorist orientation is clearly 
seen in ensuring security. Clear development of this type of struggle is evident in 
comparison with other aspects of security. Other areas of cooperation in providing 
security have not been adequately developed or developed at all. For the development 
of other areas, it is clearly necessary to create special permanent bodies like the 
RATS. 
Non-priority security problems remain so far only on paper, no practical steps 
have been taken. The task of giving the SCO universality is reduced only to 
combating the three forces of evil and economic cooperation. The real universality of 
the SCO in fulfilling those broad objectives and goals, which are written in its basic 
documents, is not observed. 
The SCO so far only declares its intentions and slowly creates structures for 
their implementation, ensures future activity by legal consolidation. There were no 
great practical steps except in the fight against terrorism. At the same time, the 
Shanghai organization does not have the capacity to maintain security in other areas. 
Possessing good potential, the SCO is slowly and reluctantly moving from one 
problem to another. Cautiousness of actions and non-forcing in decision-making does 
not yet ensure the implementation of the announced steps, many decisions are 
officially postponed for the future. All this can be explained only by the lack of 
resources - financial resources. Most of the SCO members are poor countries, the 
SCO budget does not correspond to the universality and scope of the announced goals 
and objectives. The SCO simply does not have the money, develop all that it wants 
and needs. But the organization nevertheless systematically tries to take its place in 
providing security against the three forces of evil, which it obviously manages. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the course of this work, a wide range of aspects of international cooperation 
in the fight against terrorism was analyzed. Within the framework of the dissertation 
research, transnational terrorist activity is considered as a threat to the modern state-
centered political system of the world. The author also substantiates the urgency and 
political importance of increasing the effectiveness of the fight against transnational 
terrorism in order to overcome the development of the crisis of the existing political 
system of the world. The results obtained in the work contribute to the theoretical 
development of the approach to transnational terrorism and the identification of 
promising areas of research in this field, give an idea of the current state of 
multilateral antiterrorist cooperation. Despite the fact that the general definition of 
transnational terrorism at the international level as a basis for legal counteraction to 
the terrorist threat to date, due to the existing insurmountable differences between 
different countries, is not yet developed, it’s very need is controversial, since 
multilateral anti-terrorist activities can and without a legally rigorous definition, as, 
for example, this is happening at the present time. In particular, one of the prominent 
theoreticians of the school of neoliberalism R. Cohen, believes that in the short term, 
terrorism will be defined "inductively and operationally - as acts of unlawful violence 
that an overwhelming number of countries of the anti-terrorist coalition consider 
illegitimate". Thus, until the legally rigorous definition of terrorism in the 
international arena is reached, it must be condemned by all countries of the world as 
an unauthorized method of conducting political struggle, including in the 
international arena. 
Close attention was also paid to identifying the characteristics of modern 
transnational terrorism, taking into account their importance for multilateral anti-
terrorist actions of states. As a result of the analysis it was shown that terrorism, 
developing throughout the history of mankind, today, under the influence of objective 
global processes of globalization and scientific and technological progress, has 
become a fundamentally new phenomenon. Modern transnational terrorism poses a 
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truly global task of changing the existing political system of the world and replacing 
it with another, based on separate provisions of Islam. It is the possibility of 
destroying the modern system of international relations, which has existed for more 
than 350 years and is today the universal basis of relations between the states of the 
whole world, should become a rallying factor for all countries in overcoming the 
transnational terrorist threat in the 21st century. This is the main and fundamental 
feature of transnational terrorism, taking into account that states must conduct their 
own, including multilateral, anti-terrorist policies. Other features of modern 
transnational terrorism identified during the study include the use of individual 
postulates of the Islamic religion, as the ideological basis of terror and the future 
world political system in the form of a world Islamic caliphate, the transformation of 
terrorism from the tactical method of political struggle into a strategic, long-term plan 
for realizing the idea of a just , in their opinion, the world order, the transformation of 
the structure and methods of functioning of terrorist groups, strengthening the 
importance of the media for creating an atmosphere of terror among the population, 
as well as the "advertising nature" of the terrorist acts themselves, their large-scale 
nature, the use of "suicide bombers", etc. 
As a result of the analysis of the activities of multilateral institutions such as 
the UN, NATO and the SCO, it was possible to establish that the lack of a single and 
complete understanding of the specific nature of the threat of transnational terrorism 
is today the main barrier to effective interstate cooperation at all levels. 
Unfortunately, none of the analyzed multilateral associations has yet come to the 
realization that transnational terrorism poses a threat to the modern state-centered 
political system of the world, that is, ultimately, a threat to the existence of the 
national states that form these multilateral organizations. The most vulnerable should 
feel first of all Muslim states, because, according to transnational terrorists, they act 
on the orders of Western countries and are subject to replacement by truly Islamic 
regimes.In the long term, terrorists are trying to make the whole world become a 
global Islamic caliphate, as a result of which the political system of peace with the 
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national state as a structural unit, as well as the whole system of principles for 
building internal and external political relations, will disappear. 
The analysis of practical actions to combat terrorism, taken after the events of 
September 11, including in the framework of multilateral institutions, showed that 
they are aimed primarily at preventing terrorist activity as such and condemning it as 
an unjust method of political struggle. In addition, a whole range of law enforcement, 
law enforcement, financial and economic and other measures are taken to prevent any 
further terrorist activity. These practical actions, of course, were necessary at the 
initial stage of the formation of a new antiterrorist policy of states, including, among 
other things, a demonstration of their determination and political will. However, only 
counteraction to the terrorist method is not able to solve the problem of transnational 
terrorism. After all, terrorism was and remains, first of all, a phenomenon of the 
political sphere. Thus, without an attempt to resolve the political problems that led to 
the emergence of transnational terrorism, the fight against it will never be fully 
successful. As M.M. Lebedev, "if the various conditions that give rise to the social 
base of terrorism (for example, the elimination of significant social inequalities, 
including between the" global North "and the" global South ") are nevertheless taken 
into account in the development of counter-terrorism measures, then the problem of 
building the political system of the world more adequate to contemporary realities in 
general, is practically not among the issues of counteraction under consideration 
"(44).  
To effectively combat terrorism, it is necessary to create the whole complex of 
anti-terrorist measures around the central political element - the modernized political 
system of the world. "It is based on this that it is necessary to build military, 
psychological, economic and other measures to combat terrorism." To date, as long 
as it can be stated that the states do not have a complete understanding of the entire 
range of actions necessary to eliminate the transnational terrorist threat. In addition, it 
will also be necessary to find an acceptable formula for all, so that attempts to reform 
the political system of the world, if they are made in the near future, do not look like 
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a concession to terrorists, but viewed as an objective necessity of the current stage of 
world development. 
The work explored the multilateral efforts of states in the fight against 
terrorism on the example of the UN, NATO, the multilateral anti-terrorist coalition 
outside the framework of institutionalized international associations and the SCO. 
Among international organizations with a global agenda, the UN, perhaps, 
should focus its efforts on the formation of a single international legal field to combat 
the terrorist method. To date, the measures taken by the UN to counter terrorism are 
not very effective, as they are mainly limited to recommendations, appeals and 
condemnation of terrorist activities. The lack of effective measures to combat 
terrorism by the United Nations is primarily due to financial and organizational 
reasons - the organization neither has the means nor the human resources to provide 
real and effective assistance in the fight against the terrorist method. So far, the UN 
can offer both to individual countries and international organizations, general support 
in identifying from them problematic, in terms of terrorist activities, areas. Some 
steps towards overcoming this problem were made by the EU, which in cooperation 
with the CTC of the UN Security Council created a program of targeted assistance to 
countries in need of financial injections to meet the requirements of the UN Security 
Council resolutions. However, the main task of the UN is seen in creating a global 
atmosphere of universal rejection of terrorism as such, which is an important 
condition for a successful campaign to combat transnational terrorism. In particular, 
the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the General Assembly in 
September 2006 is aimed at this, which sets out the general provisions of the anti-
terrorist struggle for all member countries of this organization, among which the 
inadmissibility of the terrorist method is emphasized, regardless of the arguments that 
may be cited in his justification. 
As to the solution of the political problems underlying transnational terrorism, 
the presence of a large number of member countries with different ideas about the 
problems of world political development is unlikely to allow the UN to come to any 
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common opinion on the necessary measures for changing the modern political system 
of the world in soon. 
In addition, NATO can make a significant contribution to the fight against 
international terrorism by organizing and promoting cooperation in four interrelated 
spheres: diplomatic, military, intelligence exchange and defense cooperation. If, 
within the framework of the fight against terrorism, the main efforts are aimed at 
improving international cooperation in the four areas listed above, and especially on 
the development of the exchange of intelligence information, NATO has the 
opportunity to make a significant contribution to the international campaign against 
terrorism. This became possible due to the fact that during the period of adaptation to 
the post-bipolar system of international relations, NATO was able to create such 
institutions as the EAPC, the Partnership for Peace, the Russia-NATO Council and 
the Mediterranean Dialogue. 
However, this does not mean that the North Atlantic alliance does not need a 
clearer design of its anti-terrorist activities. If NATO really wants to take an active 
part in the fight against transnational terrorism, it must first of all come to a common 
understanding among its member countries as a threat to transnational terrorism for 
the modern political system of the world and a necessary political strategy to combat 
it. Without this, the whole future fate of NATO's counter-terrorism activities will be 
questioned. 
The international antiterrorist coalition, which is an informal union of states, 
can also play an important role in the anti-terrorist campaign, in the opinion of the 
author. In the face of a single threat of a revision of the modern world-political 
system, the participating states of the coalition have a higher motivation for 
cooperation than ever. And although the activity of the coalition, or rather of the 
coalition complex, is also being built around the fight against the terrorist method, in 
the future it is the informal structure and the voluntary principle of participation that 
can help in the search for new directions of activity, which can also resolve the 
political problems underlying transnational terrorism. The possibility of attracting a 
wide range of non-state entities is also an additional advantage. However, it is 
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necessary that the states understand the complexity of the problem and the 
importance of its coordinated decision, and the coalition should be as representative 
as possible. 
As already noted, the fight against terrorism cannot be based only on 
countering the terrorist method, although efforts in this direction, especially at the 
initial stage, are a prerequisite for further steps in countering terrorism, as it is 
necessary to address the political problems underlying the transnational terrorism. 
Without this, any attempt to counter the political phenomenon, which is transnational 
terrorism, will ultimately be only partially effective. Thus, the future formula for a 
successful anti-terrorist struggle against transnational terrorism must be twofold: on 
the one hand, efforts are needed to adapt the modern political system of the world to 
the realities of today so that all its elements, including the Muslim world, included in 
the world political processes, on the other hand, these actions need to be accompanied 
by a set of measures to prevent terrorist activities, the punishment for which must be 
inevitable regardless of its motivation. 
To achieve maximum effectiveness in this direction at the multilateral level, it 
is necessary to build, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of functions, a 
complex coordinated system of interaction between interstate organizations and 
associations, so that their activities within the framework of the global antiterrorist 
campaign give the best result. 
Today, a new philosophy of development and integration within the SCO 
framework is obvious: the desire to create "decent living conditions for its citizens", 
the introduction of high social standards and the convergence of value guidelines. 
This requires the development of a joint socio-political and economic strategy for the 
modernization of the SCO member states, its filling with practical content and 
concrete projects on a bilateral and multilateral basis. 
The SCO was created as an organization to address border problems and 
security issues. Today, it is increasingly responsive to such contemporary challenges 
as globalization, the economic crisis, social instability, environmental problems. In 
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the future, the SCO can become a real source and center of a "social and economic 
breakthrough" not only on a regional but also on a global scale. 
At the moment, the most important priority is the further social development of 
the SCO member states within the framework of a different speed movement towards 
regional integration. 
The whole set of factors affecting the creation of tension in the states of 
Eastern Eurasia located in the SCO space, especially in Central Asia, can be 
conditionally grouped into three main: 
- The presence of separatist sentiments among large ethnic groups in a number 
of Eastern Eurasian states; 
- The desire of radical religious organizations to realize the idea of uniting 
some Muslim countries of Central and East Asia into large Islamic caliphates or other 
state entities with a Sharia form of government; 
- Insurgent speeches of certain forces fighting with existing regimes in 
individual countries. 
At the same time, in some states the basis for the activities of the above forces 
is a combination of different motives, but they are united by the growing use of 
extremist and even terrorist methods of achieving the goals. 
At the summit in June 2001 in Shanghai, the leaders of the six SCO member 
states were recognized as important not to delay with the implementation of the 
signed Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. This 
document, containing agreed definitions of such complex international concepts and 
phenomena as terrorism, separatism and extremism, was aimed at practical 
cooperation of the participating countries in countering these negative and dangerous 
phenomena. 
Subsequently, the decisions of the St. Petersburg summit held in 2002 laid the 
foundation for the development of the main line of interaction between the SCO 
member states - the counteraction to international terrorism, religious extremism, 
national separatism (the so-called "Central Asian triangle" or "three evils" ", In 
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Chinese terminology). In this regard, ensuring the readiness of countries to repel the 
terrorist threat has become one of the main tasks of the SCO participants. 
In June 2002, at the summit in St. Petersburg, an Agreement was signed 
between the SCO member states on the Regional Antiterrorist Structure. The 
Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is designed to facilitate coordination and 
interaction of the competent bodies of the SCO parties in the fight against terrorism, 
separatism and extremism. The RATS is a permanent body of the SCO with its 
headquarters in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. If necessary, the Council of Heads of State of 
the SCO member states may establish RATS offices in the territory of any of the 
member countries. Financing of this organization is carried out from the means of the 
SCO budget and today it is about 1 million US dollars. The RATS Council includes 
30 people, including seven from Russia. 
The main objectives of the RATS are the development of proposals and 
recommendations on the development of cooperation in the fight against terrorism, as 
well as the assistance of member states in combating new threats. RATS will also 
collect, analyze information and form a databank for international terrorist and 
extremist organizations, their leaders, structures and individuals involved in these 
organizations. In addition, the RATS is expected to analyze the status and trends of 
the spread of terrorism and extremism, as well as gather information on non-
governmental organizations and individuals supporting terrorists. 
In conclusion, I want to say that the SCO's antiterrorist orientation is clearly 
seen in ensuring security. Clear development of this type of struggle is evident in 
comparison with other aspects of security. Other areas of cooperation in providing 
security have not been adequately developed or developed at all. For the development 
of other areas, it is clearly necessary to create special permanent bodies like the 
RATS. 
The SCO so far only declares its intentions and slowly creates structures for 
their implementation, ensures future activity by legal consolidation. There were no 
great practical steps except in the fight against terrorism. At the same time, the 
Shanghai organization does not have the capacity to maintain security in other areas. 
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Possessing good potential, the SCO is slowly and reluctantly moving from one 
problem to another. Cautiousness of actions and non-forcing in decision-making does 
not yet ensure the implementation of the announced steps, many decisions are 
officially postponed for the future. All this can be explained only by the lack of 
resources - financial resources. Most of the SCO members are poor countries, the 
SCO budget does not correspond to the universality and scope of the announced goals 
and objectives. The SCO simply does not have the money, develop all that it wants 
and needs. But the organization nevertheless systematically tries to take its place in 
providing security against the three forces of evil, which it obviously manages. 
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